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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS AND THE FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRY 
 
 The food processing industry is dominated by large corporations. These firms play a 
critical role in forming the derived demand faced by agricultural producers, but little is 
understood about how these companies make strategic choices. Organizational economics 
provides a framework for exploring the firm’s decision process. However, several theories exist 
in this discipline, operating in fundamentally different ways. This paper examines the two 
prevalent organizational theories, Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory, through a 
study of the food processing industry. This sector is thoroughly analyzed in order to make 
predictions from each theory regarding the aspects of capital structure and firm expansion. With 
accounting data for a sample of food processing firms, these predictions are then tested 
empirically using an ICAPM model in a cross-section of expected stock returns. Our results 
indicate that Agency Theory is the relevant organizational model for food manufacturers, making 
it the appropriate tool for evaluating the actions of these firms in agricultural markets.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1   Objective 
Industrialization of the US food system has fundamentally changed the relationship 
between agricultural producers and food manufacturers. The strategic actions of food processing 
firms now have a direct effect on agriculture. Farmers are often part of a vast network of 
suppliers coordinated by a large food manufacturer (Menard and Klein 2004, 753; Knoeber 
1989, 281). Therefore, the strategies of agricultural producers are dictated in large part by the 
actions of food manufacturing companies. Understanding the motivations that drive food 
processing firms is then crucial to farm managers. All firms are organized in some manner, and 
different organizational structures create different behavioral incentives for decisions (Sykuta 
and James 2004, 758). As a result, organizational economics is an effective tool for analyzing the 
dynamics of food processor decision-making, providing needed guidance for farmers and other 
parties involved in the agrifood sector (Cook and Barry 2004, 743).  
 The two most widely accepted organizational theories are Transaction Cost Economics 
and Agency Theory. The objective of this study was to determine which theory, Transaction Cost 
Economics or Agency Theory, better describes the actions of food processors. Little is 
understood about organization of the modern food manufacturing corporation. Yet, the strategies 
chosen by these companies are a function of their organizational designs. Thus, understanding 
the organization of these firms will allow us to make substantial inferences about their intra-firm 
decision processes.   
1.2 Hypotheses  
 Transaction Cost Economics has long been the accepted rationale for firm decision-
making (Macdonald 2004, 745). Yet, to explore the truth of this assumption we will investigate 
two specific firm choices. First, we hypothesize that Transaction Cost Economics explains 
selection of capital structure in the food processing industry. Second, we propose the hypothesis 
that Transaction Cost Economics better describes firm expansion decisions in this sector. These 
two null hypotheses will be tested in order to reach our objective of determining which prevalent 
organizational model has more relevance in the food processing industry.  
 To define our first hypothesis more specifically, we outline the predictions that will later 
be developed and tested. Transaction Cost Economics predicts capital structure based on the 
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nature of the firm’s transactions. Because of specificity, frequency, and uncertainty in both the 
upstream and downstream transactions of food processors, this model suggests that an increase in 
debt will decrease firm value, while more free cash flow would only increase firm value. 
Conversely, Agency Theory predicts capital structure choice through the governance abilities of 
financial mechanisms. Relatively weak internal and external discipline being applied to food 
manufacturers will result in the expectation of increased firm value with additional debt, and a 
decrease in firm value with larger amounts of free cash flow. These divergent predictions about 
how food processors select capital structures then provide a test of whether Transaction Cost 
Economics is the more powerful model. 
 It will also be helpful to convey our second hypothesis in greater detail. Transaction Cost 
Economics predicts that firm expansion will occur only to minimize on the costs of exchange. 
The nature of the food processing industry suggests few such opportunities, but this theory 
indicates that any acquisitions that do occur must be value-building. Agency Theory expects the 
outcome of firm expansion to depend on the strength of governance structures involved. The 
nature of governance in this sector implies a value-destroying effect from acquisitions. Thus, the 
contrast in predictions concerning firm expansion offers another test of whether Transaction Cost 
Economics is the dominant organizational paradigm in the food manufacturing industry.  
 Through a detailed analysis of the food processing industry based on the principles of 
Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory, we will be able to develop the above 
predictions about capital structure and acquisition. These predictions form the basis of our null 
hypotheses, and will then be compared to empirical tests on a sample of food processing firms. 
The model that most accurately describes the observed actions of food processors will be the one 
that correctly represents organization in this industry. The contradictory predictions of these 
models will be used to resolve whether we must reject the null hypotheses of Transaction Cost 
Economic organization. This experiment will thus meet our objective of discovering which 
organizational model, Transaction Cost Economics or Agency Theory, best applies to the food 
manufacturing industry. 
1.3 Industry Trends 
Organizational research relating to food processing firms currently has added importance 
due to the evolution of this industry in recent years. Several major structural changes have 
occurred in this sector. First, food demand has fragmented, leading to a new, consumer-driven, 
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marketing channel. Processors must stay abreast of current shifts in tastes, demographics, and 
health concerns (Barkema et al. 1991, 26). Second, the food supply chain is being reengineered, 
further complicating tasks for the food manufacturer. New technologies, business practices, and 
market conditions are all causing significant changes in companies’ operations (King and 
Phumpiu 1996, 1182). Finally, retail firms are gradually concentrating (Connor and Schiek 1997, 
325). All of these factors are relevant in agricultural markets to the extent they alter food 
processor decisions. Food manufacturers eventually handle over 90% of the value of US farm 
production, so impact of this industry on the demand for agricultural products is far from trivial 
(Connor and Schiek 1997, 60). 
This transformation of the food processing industry will ultimately have a significant 
impact on every stage of production and marketing in the food channel. Unfortunately, this 
industry has evolved so quickly that surprisingly little is known about how firm strategy is 
chosen. Numerous small food processors exist, but the vast majority of manufacturing is done by 
larger companies organized in the corporate structure common to other sectors of the economy. 
This creates a situation where recognizing the decision-making process in this industry quite 
challenging, making it difficult for farmers and other parties in the food system to position 
themselves. Corporations are multidimensional organizations, and to truly understand their 
behavior we must seek to learn the basic rationale that guides everyday firm operation.  
1.4   Procedure 
We will use organizational economics to examine the food processing industry. 
Organizational economics can be broadly defined as the construction of firm relations. That is, 
the structure that defines how actors within or between organizations behave. Understanding 
how actors work within the dynamics of the firm allows for a much deeper appreciation of firm 
activities. In this paper, through an examination of capital structure and acquisition activity 
within the food processing industry, we will conduct a test of the two main theories in the field 
of organizational economics. This study should help explain why large food processing firms 
undertake certain activities. Markets are made up of competing actors who attempt to respond to 
the desires of buyers. Analyzing the food manufacturing firms that use such a large proportion of 
farm production will help us better understand agricultural markets. Yet, very little research has 
been done by agricultural economists using the principles of economic organization.  
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Study is warranted given the practical importance of these concepts to the current food 
channel. If it could be determined which model best explains firm activity in this industry, then 
this knowledge could be exploited to more effectively analyze food markets. It is in this hope 
that we begin with an overview of the two prevalent economic organization theories in chapter 
two, followed by a discussion of the observable aspects of capital structure and firm expansion in 
chapter three. In chapter four, the food processing industry is examined in relation to each model, 
with ensuing organizational predictions about capital structure and firm expansion. Finally, these 
predictions are tested empirically and the results presented in chapter five. Chapter six discusses 
application of these results, and the study is concluded in chapter seven. Through this process we 
will be able to observe which organizational model best fits the food manufacturing industry, 
thereby explaining the firm actions noted as being so relevant to US agriculture.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 
2.1   Prevalent Organizational Models  
Two main theories dominate the field of organizational economics, Transaction Cost 
Economics and Agency Theory. Empirical examination of the influence of selected capital 
structure and acquisition activity on firm performance will attempt to show which of these 
theories of economic organization is supported in the marketplace. Organizational economics has 
a firm-specific quality, so this approach can only draw broad conclusions about the food 
processing industry. However, these conclusions could begin the process of building an 
organizational basis for understanding food manufacturing firms, and may provide methodology 
that could be incorporated into exploring other sectors as well. 
 To undertake this examination we must first discuss these two prevalent organizational 
theories in some detail. Neither idea is a new one. Agency Theory has existed since Adam Smith 
first pondered the problem of agency conflict in The Wealth of Nations. These ideas were 
expanded during the early 1900s by Berle and Means in their landmark work “The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property”. Subsequently, these concepts have been considered by those 
such as Fama, Jensen, Meckling, and numerous others.  
 Transaction Cost Economics was first credited to Ronald Coase, who touched on the 
subject in the 1930s in his classic The Nature of the Firm. This theory has been advanced in 
recent decades by Williamson, who helped add a crucial degree of legal and mathematical rigor. 
Thus, both theories have had ample time to develop, and yet there is still no true understanding 
of which model best describes the real world. It should be noted that these theories have a 
number of similarities, both emerging from the assumption of seeking efficient contracting in an 
imperfect world where decisions are subject to the discretion of managers of both capital and 
human resources (Williamson 1988, 570). However, these models fundamentally operate in 
different ways, and in many cases come to very different conclusions. Accordingly, it will be 
necessary to fully understand these basic organizational theories if we are to examine their 
validity in the food processing industry. 
2.2   Transaction Cost Economics 
 Transaction Cost Economics is a form of analysis focusing on the exchange of goods 
between economic actors. The focal point of this analysis is the transaction. Firms seek to find 
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the most economical governance structure (Williamson 1979, 235). Organizations will want to 
find the way in which the total cost of exchanging goods between themselves and other similar 
entities is lowest. This does not mean accounting for simple price characteristics alone, but also 
analyzing the costs of searching for, negotiating, and enforcing transaction agreements, as well 
as the accompanying costs of breach (Joskow 1985, 36). In considering these costs, a party must 
judge the frequency, uncertainty, and specificity involved with the transaction (Williamson 1979, 
239). Frequency can lead to higher transaction costs through the shear number of transactions. 
Uncertainty increases costs by forcing firms to bear risk and to undertake measures protecting 
themselves from unknown events. Specificity can lead to higher costs through losses due to 
protecting against, or falling victim to, ex-post opportunism.  
 Firms must face production expenses, as well as the transaction costs involved 
(Williamson 1979, 245). The relevant form of organization chosen will be the one that minimizes 
these costs. Transaction Cost Economics suggests several methods of organizing exchange. 
These include market transactions, neoclassical contracting, or relational contracting 
(Williamson 1979, 253). Market transactions are simply unorganized exchanges. Neoclassical 
contracts are traditional written contracts, while relational contracts are more durable and 
complex agreements built on relationships established over time (Williamson 1979, 238). 
Respectively, each of these forms denotes a higher level of intensity in organizing the exchange.  
If transaction costs are high in the open market, then transactions will be further 
organized in the form of a contract. If neoclassical contracting is not sufficient, the exchange will 
be more rigorously organized using relational contracting. Separate parties will bargain over this 
contract until it becomes desirable to organize the transaction internally. Based on the nature of 
the transaction’s frequency, uncertainty, and specificity, the firm must decide how to most 
efficiently organize this exchange. Coase suggests that “the distinguishing mark of the firm is the 
suppression of the price mechanism” (Coase 1937, 389). The firm’s boundaries exist where the 
transaction is no longer completed internally. We then have an appealing theory, a theory that 
accounts for the size and organization of firms or other business units, while also meshing 
perfectly with the basic economic tenets of profit maximization through the concept of duality. 
 The transaction cost approach views the firm as a nexus of contracts (Coase 1937, 391). 
Whether explicit or implicit, the entrepreneurial function is to create contracts of different forms 
and strengths. These methods of contracting will then persist because they are the cost-
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minimizing form of exchange. According to Transaction Cost Economics, the industry has 
organized itself for reasons of cost minimization, with the least-cost forms surviving in an 
economic evolution process (Alchian 1950, 213). These decisions on how to minimize the costs 
of transacting ex-post form the basis of Transaction Cost Economics.  
2.3   Agency Theory 
 A slightly different method called Agency Theory is also available for dissecting the 
organizational structure of firms. This approach is based on the idea that firms may not be acting 
to build shareholder value. Such a possibility occurs because firms are often not run by the 
owners, but rather by professional managers. The defining characteristic of the modern 
corporation is this separation of ownership from control (Berle and Means 1932, 8). This creates 
the agency problem, and losses result if agents’ (employees’) decisions diverge from those 
optimally desired by the principals (owners) (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 308). If asset 
ownership and risk were restricted to managers, there would be no agency problem (Fama and 
Jensen 1983, 322). Yet, there are inherent benefits in separating management and ownership. 
First, the limits on raising capital are far less restrictive. In addition, professional management 
allows for realization of specific knowledge in management functions throughout the firm, as 
well as a more even bearing of investment risk and nearly risk-neutral decision making (Fama 
and Jensen 1983, 308). For larger and more complex companies this seems a more efficient 
structure, but the cost is the agency problem.  
 However, the agency problem can be controlled through proper monitoring and 
incentives within the firm, as well as discipline from outside the firm. Nevertheless, deviations 
from optimal contracting (a perfectly efficient agency relationship) persist in the real world 
(Bebchuck and Fried 2003, 72). This allows for the possibility that different motives drive the 
firm. Maximizing shareholder wealth may not necessarily be the primary goal of management. 
Management has the opportunity to squander corporate wealth should it so choose (Morck 1988, 
293). Managers can also naturally derive personal utility from some types of value-destroying 
behavior (Morck 1988, 294). The inclination for some managers is to attempt to reduce their 
employment risk, and increase their compensation (Bebchuck and Fried 2003, 72). Managers 
may also derive utility from the consumption of certain perquisites furnished by the firm (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976, 312). These conflicts between the owners and managers of the complex firm 
as they align incentives ex-ante form the basis of Agency Theory. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Capital Structure and Firm Expansion 
3.1   Testable Aspects 
 Economics is a social science rooted in the actions of individuals who nearly always have 
divergent interests. Organizational economics considers these shortcomings, and how businesses 
are structured to deal with these features in an imperfect world. Whatever the structural issue, 
organizational economics is a useful tool in accounting for the imperfect traits inherent within 
the relationships that define the firm. Of course, there are numerous facets of the firm affected by 
the organizational form. Yet, in this paper we will utilize two aspects broadly associated with 
firm financing, capital structure and acquisition activity. Vickner points out that there appears to 
be a general void within the field of agricultural economics concerning financial management 
(Vickner 2001, 1). Nonetheless, we have not overlooked this area, as it affords readily 
observable data about key decisions of the company, making it well suited to empirical 
investigation. The development of capital structure and firm expansion decisions also provide 
excellent insight about the underlying organizational design. 
 The capital structure selected has an effect on nearly every activity of the firm. Strategic 
initiatives are always undertaken with some form of capital consideration inherent within the 
decision. This logically includes the decision to acquire other firms, surely one of the most 
crucial tactical options. Organizational economics deals with both constructing capital 
arrangements and expanding firm boundaries. Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory 
are broad organizational models that pertain to these issues as only a modest subset of the 
concepts they encompass. Importantly, both of these organizational theories make active 
predictions about these two firm aspects. Therefore, examining these characteristics will be a 
meaningful way to investigate the validity of these organizational paradigms. 
3.2   Decision Context  
 Ideally, all projects with a positive net present value would be financed, while those 
destroying value would not. Yet, companies operate in an imperfect world with respect to 
financial theory. Investment in the economy is hindered by the presence of informational 
asymmetry and opportunism (Kochlar 1996, 714). Managers with bounded rationality must make 
timely decisions in an exceedingly complex world (Barton 1988, 623). Human actors invest in 
firms run by other equally flawed human actors. All markets are imperfect, and the highly-
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efficient capital markets are still no exception. Thus, it is clear that the discipline of the financial 
system can be imperfect at monitoring the internal capital arrangements of firms (Gibbs 1993, 
52). 
 One of the most important financial investment decisions is whether to expand the 
boundaries of the firm. Optimally, expansion of the firm increases the overall value of the 
company. The firm may realize economies of scale, gain market power, or achieve various other 
synergies. Once again the real world does not exactly follow economic theory, and acquisition 
decisions may be subject to similar market imperfections. Some value-creating acquisitions may 
not be undertaken, while other value-destroying acquisitions could be completed.  
Capital structure and firm expansion are then two key decisions for the firm, but they are 
also decisions steeped in complexity. Within the market there is some method by which firms 
make such choices. The design of firm relations will matter when information and actors are 
imperfect. Theoretical market perfection will never hold, and thus organizational structure plays 
some role in these decisions. We will now look to our organizational paradigms to find their 
respective predictions about capital structure and firm expansion. There are clearly some 
significant differences between these models, and nowhere is this more obvious than in these two 
aspects. 
3.3   Organizational Determinants of Capital Structure 
Capital structure is an area where these theories make divergent  predictions, and thereby 
provides an excellent perspective from which to examine their validity. Capital structure choice 
is, for the most part, readily observable in firms. Publicly-traded firms are required to submit 
quarterly and annual reports, making much of the firm’s raw financial data accessible. In this 
regard, we can see the foundations for a discussion of economic organization through the 
observed capital structures selected by firms. To undertake such an analysis, it will be necessary 
to examine the differences in the predictions of these models for the optimal capital structure. 
Both of these theories exert that capital structure is a function of the nature of the firm. 
Like many other aspects of economic organization, capital structure can simply be viewed as the 
result of economic relationships, here between suppliers and users of capital (Kochar 1996, 715). 
Capital is an undifferentiated commodity input to production, and as such nothing suggests that 
one type of financing is naturally better suited to some activities in a world of perfect contracts 
(Williamson 1988, 579). Yet, as we have discussed, financial exchanges are subject to 
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complexities induced by imperfect contracting conditions. The objective in financial agreements, 
as in any other type of contracting, will then be to choose the form that economizes on costs in 
an imperfect world. The costs considered will differ in the model being utilized, but in the most 
general sense financial structure is selected by considering a trade-off between required outlays 
and governance characteristics (Kochar 1996, 716). 
 It should be noted that the financial literature identifies several other factors such as tax 
considerations, growth, industry effects, size, volatility, and profitability as other determinants of 
capital structure (Titman 1988, 2). Yet, our analysis focuses only on the application of 
organizational theory. Organizational economics argues that firms finance themselves in the way 
that minimizes cost, encompassing other exogenous considerations. The relevant question is 
what costs, and similarly what model, dominate these choices? This type of examination is 
possible when the models make different predictions, as is exactly the case with firm capital 
structure. 
3.3.1   Transaction Cost Economics’ Capital Structure Prescriptions  
The differences in prescribed capital arrangements are manifested in the most basic 
determinants of this structure. Transaction cost analysis puts forth that capital structure is driven 
by the asset nature of the firm. Harking back to our earlier discussion, we know that this theory 
deals with the nature of transactions. In finance, Transaction Cost Economics now focuses on the 
specificity of assets used in production and exchange. Transaction Cost Economics considers the 
idiosyncratic nature of resources throughout the firm, and thus predicts capital structure in 
relation to the characteristics of these inputs. Under this theory, capital structure will be chosen 
to minimize costs given the uniqueness of firm resources. However, debt and equity finance will 
have disparate costs due to the differences in the way these mechanisms operate.  
Transaction Cost Economics suggests that equity will apply the more restrictive form of 
governance (Kochar 1996, 716). The more intrusive system of monitoring managerial actions in 
equity financing will make this system less desirable. However, the resource nature of the firm 
may make this form of finance necessary. The use of the more market-like debt mechanism will 
be overly costly when the resources of the firm are of a very specific nature (Williamson 1988, 
580). The salvage value of these highly idiosyncratic assets would be low in the event of default. 
This will provide little asset collateral to the bond holder, and will thus make debt financing very 
costly. Debt will then be precluded, and the obtrusive monitoring and control systems inherent in 
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equity will have to be employed, as it provides the low-cost form of financing in these cases. The 
capital structure decision in Transaction Cost Economics is depicted below in figure 1. 
Figure 1        Capital Structure Choice in Transaction Cost Economics 
 
 
3.3.2   Agency Theory’s Capital Structure Prescriptions 
The perspective of Agency Theory is quite different. This model is based on the idea of 
minimizing losses occurring due to the disconnect that exists between the desires of principles 
and the actions of agents. Given these considerations, this theory then focuses on capital 
structure as a mechanism to provide a measure of governance. Financial commitments can 
provide a more intense pressure on management to be diligent. Coercion and threats have added 
credibility due to certain legal rights endowed under various financial mechanisms (Jensen 1986, 
324). Managers will then have little recourse but to meet these financial obligations, which if 
structured correctly can greatly diminish the set of opportunities for agents to shirk or cheat 
principles. Thus, capital structure is sought as a way to reduce moral hazards by applying outside 
financial discipline to those managing the firm.  
In accordance with this theory, debt is viewed as the more restrictive form of financial 
governance. Debt holders have stronger claims on the firm’s assets in the case of default, and 
thus impose the risk of managers losing their employment and control of the firm in the case of 
bankruptcy (Kochar 1996, 715). Meeting debt obligations is a way to enforce responsible action 
on the part of the agent, making these parties pay cash flows to bond holders, even if 
accumulating cash would otherwise have been utility maximizing. Free cash flows are 
distributed, and diligent management is undertaken to maintain the firm’s solvency. In this 
Source: Kochar1996, 717 
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manner, increasing firm debt acts as a type of bond on managers because of the threat of default 
(Jensen 1986, 324). This will reduce agency costs, making debt a powerful governance 
mechanism in Agency Theory.  
However, this theory does allow for the existence of equity financing. This method 
becomes necessary because of the risk distortion that could occur with an extremely heavy debt 
load. Bondholders retain the downside risk in any investment, possibly leading firms to consider 
riskier projects that have positive expected values only after these downside risks have been 
subtracted (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 335). Thus, we can see that Agency Theory also suggests 
that use of both of these financial mechanisms will likely be present. The optimal mix of debt 
and equity is simply the one where agency costs are minimized, occurring when the marginal 
incentive dilution effects of equity are equal to the risk distortion effects of debt in the financial 
market (Williamson 1988, 578). The capital structure decision under Agency Theory is 
summarized in figure 2.  
Figure 2          Capital Structure Choice in Agency Theory 
 
 
3.3.3   Previous Empirical Findings Regarding Capital Structure 
 Prior research has been done in this area. Barton empirically shows that, in choosing a 
capital structure, firms with different strategies react differently to financial measures (Barton 
1988, 629). Further, managers appear to desire freedom from debt whenever possible (Barton 
1988, 630). These results indicate that pure economic features are not the sole determinants of 
capital structure (Barton 1988, 630). This work lends strong support to Agency Theory. 
Source: Jensen and Meckling 1976, 344 
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However, other research in this area provides equal validation for the Transaction Cost 
Economics approach. Titman finds that firms which can potentially impose high costs on 
markets, customers, or suppliers in the event of bankruptcy, tend to choose lower debt ratios 
(Titman 1988, 14). Thus, debt is found to be negatively related to the level of “uniqueness” in the 
firm’s business, as transaction analysis would suggest (Titman 1988, 17). Overall, there seems to 
be evidence supporting both theories in the financial literature, but no true conclusions.  
3.4   Organizational Determinants of Firm Expansion 
 Organizational economics also deals with the concept of firm expansion. Therefore, 
another method by which we can readily examine the ideas of organizational theory is through 
acquisition activity. Firms have the opportunity to expand or contract their boundaries. This 
choice is also a function of the organizational structure of the company. The decision to adjust 
the boundaries of the firm is internal, that is made by management, although sometimes with 
voting approval by shareholders. Thus, the firm’s organizational structure plays a big role in 
these decisions as well.  
   Some companies have been and will continue to be more prone to such activities than 
others. This trait can be due to industry characteristics, or other firm-specific opportunities. Yet, 
organizational structure of the firm plays an important role. Clearly acquisitions come in 
different types, such as horizontal (i.e. geographic) or vertical (i.e. suppliers and retailers). These 
assorted categories of expansion activity may have very different underlying motivations. In 
some instances both theories predict the same effect for a type of acquisition. Yet, the main 
overall difference is in the end results of these strategic maneuvers. 
3.4.1   Transaction Cost Economics’ Prescriptions for Acquisition 
 In accordance with Transaction Cost Economics, firm expansion is undertaken if doing 
so minimizes the cost of transactions. As discussed earlier, this theory considers several different 
dimensions of transactions by the firm. Should frequency, uncertainty, or specificity make 
transaction by open market or contracting costly, then it may become beneficial to extend the 
boundaries of the firm. The complexity and costs involved in such problematic transactions make 
it cheaper for the firm to internalize them, substituting market exchange for coordination by firm 
management (Coase 1937, 388).  
Following this paradigm, this is the only circumstance where firm boundaries will be 
manipulated. Horizontal acquisitions may be undertaken to capture market power, economies of 
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scale, or other tangible economic benefits. Vertical acquisitions will be undertaken only to the 
extent they decrease costs of exchange. Unrelated acquisition is almost an unconsidered 
possibility under this theory. Firms seek to capture value, and will only undertake acquisitions 
when transaction costs can be minimized in some way by suppression of the open market price 
mechanism (Coase 1937, 390). This theory then predicts that acquisitions will always build firm 
value.  
3.4.2   Agency Theory’s Prescriptions for Acquisition 
 Agency Theory also makes predictions about expansion of firm boundaries. Agency 
Theory does not exclude value-creating acquisitions, such as those found in Transaction Cost 
Economics. However, Agency Theory does allow for firm expansion that is value-destroying, as 
it points out that these internal decisions may be subject to agency conflict since they are made 
by managers with divergent motives. Agency Theory in finance focuses on the costs associated 
with the free cash flows of the firm. Free cash flows are the cash flows in excess of that required 
to fund all projects that have positive net present values (Mann 1991, 214). Under Agency 
Theory, the system of monitoring and control is imperfect, resulting in losses to the principals 
from the misuse of these uncommitted cash flows. Managers will have incentive to use free cash 
flows to finance projects within the firm that fit their own motives, instead of distributing this 
cash to stockholders. The objective of owners in this context is to curtail the harm caused by 
undesired investment decisions, again minimizing the overall cost of operations.  
These managerial decisions are an important aspect of the agency conflict in firm 
expansion. Expanding the boundaries of the firm may serve some ulterior motives held by the 
agent. Meeting growth requirements for bonuses, or simply the hubris of “empire building” are 
possible examples of management objectives (Jensen 1986, 323). Although expansions for such 
reasons are not desired by the principles, they can be undertaken in some circumstances. 
Horizontal and vertical acquisitions can still be completed on the same value-creating grounds, 
but there is the additional possibility that such acquisitions are done for other selfish reasons. In 
addition, Agency Theory also allows for acquisitions that are completely unrelated to the 
company’s current business. The overall point is that, although acquisition may be value-
building, it is possible for agency conflict to lead to value-destroying expansion activity by the 
firm.  
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3.4.3   Previous Empirical Findings Regarding Firm Expansion  
Research has been done in this area as well, focusing primarily on the “free cash flow 
hypothesis”. This idea is closely related to Agency Theory.  Excess cash flows provide managers 
with the opportunity to avoid financial market monitoring, allowing for expansion and 
diversification of the firm in ways not necessarily desired by the company’s principles (Gibbs 
1993, 52). Gibbs examines the relationship of capital arrangements to the firm in restructuring 
and diversifying, finding that restructuring is correlated with increased debt and stronger 
governance mechanisms (Gibbs 1993, 63). Similarly, Harford finds that cash-rich firms 
undertake a greater number of acquisitions, and that these are more likely to be value-destroying 
(Harford 1999, 1995). Morck et al. conclude that managerial objectives drive value-destroying 
firm expansion activity (Morck et al. 1990, 47). Thus, this body of research lends some support 
to the presence of agency problems in firm expansion. Yet, this research is far from conclusive, 
and falls very short of forming the basis to reject Transaction Cost Economics.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Food Processing Industry 
4.1   Industry Overview 
 Organizational Economics suggests that existing forms of organization persist for a 
reason, and that ineffective structures fall to the wayside (Alchian 1950, 213). Many 
organizational forms then become quite industry specific, based on unique characteristics within 
the sector that cause a structure to evolve over time. Jensen and Meckling argue that in industries 
where incentive effects of outside equity or debt are widely different, we would expect to see 
specialization in the use of the low agency-cost financing arrangement (Jensen and Meckling 
1976, 355). Similarly, industry traits can be expected to strongly influence the nature of 
acquisition activity within a sector. Understanding industry specifics is crucial for interpreting 
any structural tendencies. The food processing industry has its own unique characteristics that 
affect its organization. We will now undertake an examination of the specific features of the food 
manufacturing industry, and how this makeup might translate into organizational predictions 
about capital structure and firm expansion. 
Food manufacturers are firms that transform animal, vegetable, or marine material into 
intermediate or edible products (Connor and Schiek 1997, 3). Food processing is a large segment 
of the US manufacturing sector, comprising the biggest overall industry group and accounting 
for over 11% of the value-added (Connor and Schiek 1997, 68). It is not surprising that food 
processors take on many of the qualities typically associated with a general manufacturing 
company. Any illusions about firms engaged in “kitchen” preparation should be quickly 
dispelled. The food processing industry operates at a tremendous volume, employing over 1.6 
million workers and accounting for shipments worth over 450 billion dollars in 1995 (Connor 
and Schiek 1997, 121). To accomplish this, the industry has become very capital intensive and 
highly “industrialized”. US food manufacturers are the most efficient in the world, benefiting 
Americans who now pay consistently lower prices for their processed food (Connor and Schiek 
1997, 75). Food processing today is not an antiquated offshoot of agricultural production, but 
rather a technology-driven and highly complex global industry. 
Food processors combine agricultural inputs, labor, and capital to form food products. 
Not all these products are end goods for consumers, as approximately 25% are sold as semi-
processed products to be further manufactured by other companies (Connor and Schiek 1997, 
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304). Yet, aside from this intermediate business, food manufacturers also sell to wholesale 
distributors, retail grocers, or food service firms (this flow of goods will later be depicted in 
figure 3). Products come in all shapes, sizes, and varieties, with subsequent effects on the chosen 
distribution channel. Regardless of the product or market channel, it is clear that the system is 
becoming more intricate. Technology has been injected into the system in recent years, and has 
revolutionized warehousing and logistics (King and Phumpiu 1996, 1182). This has led to a 
much more streamlined supply chain that cuts waste at every opportunity.  
Adding to the complexity of these supply side changes are the evolving demands by 
consumers. Food demand has splintered, with consumers desiring an increasing variety of 
products, and a higher degree of processing than ever before (Barkema et al. 1991, 126). Greater 
ethnic diversity and increased income have led to a push for a larger assortment of food products, 
many with some traditional ethnic attributes. Meeting the demands for convenience in the 
American home is also becoming an ever more arduous task, as time strapped consumers desire 
an array of products that require barely any preparation. Furthermore, product uniformity is of 
growing importance in a supply chain that values consistency. Thus, the food system has not 
only become more cost focused in recent years, but more sensitive to quality control as well 
(Kinsey and Senauer 1996, 1190).  
We will now examine this industry and its current trends using the two organizational 
economic theories already espoused. These models focus on very different aspects of the food 
manufacturing industry, as shown in figure 3. Food manufacturers purchase inputs from 
numerous sources, while at the same time selling product to many destinations. The nature of 
these exchanges is considered by Transaction Cost Economics, represented in the figure by the 
blue boxes. The firm is subject to an internal system of control, as well as discipline from 
external sources. The characteristics of these governance structures are dealt with in Agency 
Theory, shown in the figure by the red box. Both theories predict firm decisions as a function of 
economic relationships, but figure 3 demonstrates how the relationships of interest are distinct. 
The crux of each model is fundamentally different from that of the other. In striving to 
reach our study objective, we must determine which area of focus is more effective at predicting 
firm activity in the food processing industry. It will be necessary to choose a logical approach to 
this rather formidable task. The only reasonable manner in which to attempt this analysis is to 
separately and methodically examine this industry from the perspective of each theory. 
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Figure 3    Agency Theory, Transaction Cost Economics, and the Food Processing Industry 
 
 
4.2   Transaction Cost Economics in the Food Processing Industry  
 We have discussed the elements that compose the nature of the transaction. Yet, it will be 
necessary to further expound on some facets of these concepts that will have an industry specific 
dimension. To analyze the food processing industry, we must closely examine these elements 
within it. Searching for, negotiating, and enforcing contracts, along with the subsequent cost of a 
breach of contract, must all be considered in an industry context. These are all relevant costs to 
any transaction that must be equally weighted when considering a form of organization.  
Yet, it is also clear that contracts, no matter what the strength, do not always work. 
Informational asymmetries can lead one party to dupe the other, or in some way take advantage 
of their situation (Cooter and Ulen 2000, 43). Even if perfect information exists, no matter how 
thoroughly negotiated and explicit the terms, there will always be some chance of an 
unforeseeable event occurring. Some detail will be omitted from the contract, and thus complete 
contracting is a theoretical fallacy. The tradeoff in contracting is one of the costs of added 
complexity, versus the losses due to ex-post opportunism (Williamson 1979, 246). The process 
of coordinating transactions is not as simple as it may first appear, depending on many industry 
characteristics that influence this level of contracting hazard. 
 
 
19 
 However, non-contract aspects also play a role in ensuring performance in any particular 
firm or industry. Everything may not be written into a contract, but other factors serve to bond 
the parties. Reputations, brand names, and even a profitable business relationship can all be 
powerful non-contract terms in certain industries. Firms have sunk investments into building 
reputations associated with their activities (Klein and Leffler 1981, 626). These allow trust in a 
company to keep its promises, trust that may be far more valuable to a business than any one-
time appropriation. A premium income stream will also serve as a bond to control activities 
(Klein and Leffler 1981, 617). If the value of this exceptionally profitable relationship over time 
is worth more than a single default, then the company will perform as properly as if they were 
contractually compelled to do so. 
 Yet, in any economic sector contracts and non-contract incentives will ultimately fail at 
times, allowing for ex-post opportunism, or the appropriation of quasi rents (Klein et al. 1998, 
298). This means that one party to a contract can exploit the other’s reliance on their 
performance (Cooter and Ulen 2000, 193). These rents are the result of one party taking 
advantage of the other after sunk investments have been made. Site specificity, physical asset 
specificity, human capital specificity, and dedicated assets are all sunk investments that may lead 
to appropriable quasi-rents in any given industry (Joskow 1985, 38). For investments to occur in 
this framework there needs to be some type of resolution mechanism in place. This may differ 
significantly between industries, but can include third-party arbitrators, the legal system, or 
various other methods. Parties must have confidence in the settlement machinery if any type of 
contract is to be reached (Williamson 1979, 238).  
Contractual forms develop based on the type of environment from which they arise, and 
must be considered within the contexts upon which they exist. In Transaction Cost Economics, 
efficient organization of economic activities then means matching governance structures with 
transactional attributes (Williamson 1979, 261). To understand the unique types of organization 
that Transaction Cost Economics prescribes in the food processing industry, we first must 
understand the specific nature of these transactions. In examining food processing industry 
conditions, we will break analysis into two levels. The first level will be transactions taking place 
between processors and input suppliers, which will be called “Downstream Transactions”. The 
second level will encompass transactions between processors and output buyers, which will be 
called “Upstream Transactions”. These two stages of food manufacturer transactions are shown 
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below in figure 4. Downstream and Upstream transactions are quite different in this case, and 
noting this difference will help in understanding the specific predictions of Transaction Costs 
Economics about the food processing industry. 
Figure 4                                                         Downstream and Upstream Transactions                                      
 
4.3   Downstream Transactions 
4.3.1 Downstream Specificity 
 The main input purchases of food processors are commodity agricultural products, labor, 
business services, and physical machinery. Transactions conducted by food processors are 
dominated by purchasing unspecialized labor and commodity inputs, making up approximately 
13% and 58% of total costs respectively (Connor and Schiek 1997, 220). The people and 
materials that make up this process are not highly idiosyncratic resources, but the same cannot be 
said of the food processing industry’s physical capital. It is important to observe the degree of 
physical asset specificity in the capital inputs used in food processing (Morrison 1997, 110). 
Buildings and processing equipment are the most ready examples of specialized assets. 
Processing plants are continually growing more automated to realize economies of 
industrialization (Harris et al. 2002, 3). Outside of the rapid processing of commodity inputs into 
food outputs, these machines have little, if any, second best use. Other less obvious specific 
assets include packaging technologies, or even genetic lines used by contracted producers.  
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Assets involved in downstream transactions could often be considered either to be site-
specific or dedicated assets. Dedicated or site-specific assets are not uncommon in the food 
processing industry, given the difficulties and inefficiencies inherent in shipping some products 
long distances (Martinez 2002, 3). In addition, though most human capital may not be a specific 
asset in downstream transactions, some unique knowledge is required in procuring a steady and 
consistent supply of the often perishable inputs needed to meet efficient quality and capacity 
levels. Physical assets will be the most idiosyncratic resources in the food processing industry, 
but these other types of specificity may be important to individual firms. 
An important overall distinction exists between the level of asset specificity present 
before the food processor, and that present at the manufacturing level. The trend has been for 
farm assets to become more idiosyncratic as producers become more specialized. However, 
much of the machinery, livestock, and land involved in agriculture could be readily employed by 
numerous producers. Some farm resources will be highly specific, but the problems of procuring 
and redeploying idiosyncratic assets are usually much more critical for the food manufacturer. 
The nature of resources is still relatively common at the farm production level, but at the 
processing stage of this channel we begin to see the combination of highly specific capital. The 
fact that the processing stage holds a disproportionate share of specific assets will be a 
distinguishing feature of this industry’s organizational structure. 
4.3.2   Downstream Frequency 
 In the purchases of commodity inputs required for food manufacturing, we see 
transactions that are very frequent. Agricultural products are often perishable goods that must be 
purchased on a frequent basis, although this frequency certainly varies. Some products are 
seasonal, making frequency exceptionally high for brief periods. Yet, food processors have 
traditionally organized their production systems in way that they were able to produce extremely 
large quantities for as long as possible (Pieter van Donk 2000, 739). The nature of food 
processing then entails a large scale of operations, requiring equally large amounts of inputs on 
the most consistent basis logistically practicable. The characteristics of commodity transport 
make bulk shipment not only feasible, but also economically necessary to be competitive. Aside 
from material inputs, a considerable amount of human resources are also required in the food 
manufacturing process. Labor for many production jobs is readily available (often immigrant), 
and turnover in these jobs can be extremely high. Many food processors are then constantly 
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buying agriculture inputs and relatively unskilled labor. There is a distinction in the machines 
and other capital involved. Capital items are very durable, and can be made to last as long as 
decades. Overall, while material inputs and labor are purchased frequently, capital infrastructure 
and machinery is purchased only occasionally. 
4.3.3   Downstream Uncertainty 
 Uncertainty is an inherent consideration for the food processing firm. Farm commodity 
production fluctuates over time, leaving supply and price uncertainty within the market. Many 
producers exist for nearly every farm item, so finding these inputs and having them transported is 
not usually a great concern, although in a specific year price may be an issue. When processors 
must compete for limited inputs, enough of the input item must be available to keep plants 
operating at near capacity and to meet sales commitments (Connor and Schiek 1997, 250). The 
commodity futures markets can be used to manage such risks. These markets act to disperse 
price and quantity risk, minimizing the overall amount of uncertainty the food processor is 
forced to bear.  
Nevertheless, quality and other characteristics can be quite a different story. For some 
products quality is readily observable to a satisfactory level, while for others it can be 
exceedingly difficult or impossible to judge (Kilmer and Stevens 2002, 41). Characteristics, such 
as freshness and safety of the input, may add some element of uncertainty to the transaction. 
These aspects of input supply can cause unpredictability or bottle necks in the production process 
(Pieter van Donk 2000, 744). However, government intervention (i.e. regulations, inspection, and 
grading) and scientific advances in processing technology help in alleviating this issue.  
It does seem clear that this uncertainty is becoming a growing concern for the food 
processor. In today’s consumer culture, processors are being forced to implement higher 
standards and bear the risks for ensuring that the inputs they buy are safe. As this trend 
continues, it will mean increasing complexity in the food processor’s relationship with 
agricultural producers in order to eliminate the information asymmetry that currently exists about 
many quality aspects (Hennessy 1996, 1037). There will also be a measure of uncertainty 
imposed upon transactions with suppliers of machinery inputs. With increased pressure on food 
processors, there is an even greater strain on this infrequent and highly specific transaction. In 
particular, food-safety related equipment must work properly, and firms producing such 
machines must convince processors that they will be around in the future to service these 
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products. These transactions are already highly susceptible to ex-post opportunism, and 
increased uncertainty only serves to compound this problem. 
4.3.4   Downstream Example of Transaction Cost Economics  
An example might better illustrate the concepts. Consider the downstream transactions of 
food processors in the chicken industry, in which many types of specificity are combined with 
frequent transactions and a degree of uncertainty. Unique assets exist within this sector including 
production facilities, specialized processing plants, and breeding stock engineered especially for 
broiler production (Martinez 2002, 3). These assets have limited redeployability in other uses. To 
further complicate, limited shipping distances create a relationship-specific or site-specific 
investment in these transactions (Martinez 2002, 3). Similar levels of frequency and uncertainty 
to those found in the broader food processing industry are also present in chicken manufacturing. 
 Chicken processors operate on a very large scale and require a continuous flow of live 
broilers, but these firms must also carefully manage risks, including salmonella poisoning or 
other avian disease issues. Given these characteristics, this is an industry in which the vast 
majority of broiler production is contracted. These contracts give producers strong incentives to 
consistently meet quality and cost standards, ultimately fostering long-term investments that 
discourage opportunism (Knoeber 1989, 276). The complexity of these exchanges may even lead 
to further coordination in some cases, resulting in vertical integration. Currently around 80% of 
broiler production is contracted, while integration has risen to around 20% in recent years 
(Martinez 2002, 2). In this example we can then see how the nature of transactions affects the 
downstream organization of the food processing industry. 
4.4   Upstream Transactions 
4.4.1 Upstream Specificity 
 The asset specificity involved in the upstream movement of food products once again 
seems relatively high. Large food processors operate with significant economies of scale, and 
produce massive quantities of goods in order to reduce per-unit costs. Many processors sell very 
similar products to every outlet in which they do business. This leads to the long production runs 
and accumulated stocks of end products common to food processors (Pieter van Donk 2000, 
743). However, this is not merely the nature of food processing. Retail chains want a dependable 
supplier of standardized products in all stores. Even consumers value consistency in food 
products. For processors undertaking private-label production there is an additional element of 
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specificity in these products, but it seems that even this is not great. Aside from some labeling or 
batch recipe differences, the transaction is not much more relationship-specific than for brand 
name producers (Connor and Schiek 1997, 332).  
Although the transactions may become routine, the resources required to logistically 
accomplish moving large quantities of products through this system are not. Shipping, handling, 
and other marketing functions involved in food processing are not in themselves highly 
specialized. In most instances little service is required, with the possible exception of basic 
transportation, which could itself be rather specific if the product is perishable. Overall, what is 
specific are the assets required to coordinate these operations with efficient costs. Electronic data 
interchange (EDI), computer assisted ordering (CAO) and other developments are becoming 
increasingly necessary to integrate into the mainstream food supply chain (King and Phumpiu 
1996, 1181). Information and logistical technology will then clearly be important forms of 
physical asset specificity.  
Site specificity seems likely to be low in upstream transactions, as processed food 
products are often relatively easy to ship. However, human asset specificity may be noticeably 
greater in this case since the skills of category managers, logistical personal, packaging experts, 
and marketing specialists will be very important (King and Phumpiu 1996, 1183). Dedicated 
assets abound and overlap everywhere in these transactions, as we notice a large amount of 
physical and human capital devoted solely to working with large retailers. The overall disparity 
of specific assets between food processors and retailers is not as great as we saw in the 
downstream channel. Yet, compared to buildings, sales technology, and inventory equipment 
used by retailers, the assets of the food processor are of a slightly more idiosyncratic nature. 
Again, the nature of transactions is not highly specific for the majority of the goods involved, but 
we must characterize the assets needed to facilitate these upstream transactions as being quite 
specialized. 
4.4.2   Upstream Frequency 
 There is frequent interaction between food processors and upstream buyers, although this 
aspect can vary by product. Transactions of fresh products are necessarily more frequent, while 
dry goods can be purchased far less frequently. However, transactions throughout the food 
system for nearly every type of good are becoming more frequent (Vickner 2001, 6). Recent 
retail methods such as “efficient consumer response” and “efficient replenishment” have 
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revolutionized the way logistics operate in the market (King and Phumpiu 1996, 1181). Keeping 
inventories down is cost minimizing, while closely tracking purchases ensures that limited shelf 
space is fully utilized. Delivery times tend to be short, and reliability needs to be high in the food 
processing industry (Pieter van Donk 2000, 743). Frequent shipments entail efficient inventory 
management, while cutting down on spoiled product. These factors combine to make frequency 
very high for food processors in their upstream transactions.  
4.4.3   Upstream Uncertainty 
 Uncertainty is fast becoming an area of concern for food processors in dealing with their 
upstream buyers. Here processors face a derived demand that fluctuates. Retailers have 
historically passed almost all of this uncertainty onto processors, leaving them with a “lumpy” 
demand (Pieter van Donk 2000, 743). Yet, with increased concerns about contamination and the 
need to trace back tainted items within the food system, pressure is being applied from 
consumers via retailers as well. Publicly visible retailers are highly concerned about the quality 
and safety of products they sell (Kilmer and Stevens 2002, 43). Processors then must bear some 
substantial risk for ensuring the quality of both incoming materials and outgoing products. In 
many cases, a small amount of unsafe input can contaminate a large amount of food through 
dispersion in preparation processes. For example, one diseased cattle carcass can contaminate 
thousands of pounds of ground beef as the carcasses are co-mingled. It is vital that a processor 
meet retailer requirements, as a shipment of contaminated or inferior food can endanger an 
economic relationship in a fashion inconceivable for most other manufactured products.  
Nevertheless, the food processor does have a type of equity with the retailer in their often 
well established brand names. As Joskow points out, “reputational constraints will mitigate hold-
up incentives” (Joskow 1985, 39).  In fact, over 80% of US grocery products are nationally or 
regionally branded (Harris et al. 2002, 8). Retailers will have incentive to trust the quality 
guarantees of the food processor, given the firm’s reputation and the specific business 
relationship that has developed. Maintaining this brand equity is crucial to ensuring quality food 
products, shown by the fact that average food firms spend between 25% and 35% of sales on 
advertising (Weston and Chiu 1996, 2). However, one serious recall can destroy the goodwill 
associated with a processor. The retailer’s reputation is at stake as well, adding greatly to the 
importance of this uncertainty within transactions. Food processing is a mature sector with 
established firms, but the problems of uncertainty and liability are increasing dramatically. 
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4.4.4   Upstream Example of Transaction Cost Economics  
An example might once again be illustrative. In keeping with our chicken example, one 
processor that might characterize these upstream transactions as highly specific would be the 
US’s leading chicken manufacturer, Tyson Foods. In many parts of the country, Tyson is the 
chicken supplier to Wal-Mart. Although the scale offered by Wal-Mart is unparalleled, Tyson 
can also realize efficiencies in marketing and shipping (Cotterill 2001, 49). Yet, to participate in 
this venture Tyson has undoubtedly been forced to undertake significant investments in capital 
and relationship-specific assets to integrate itself into the Wal-Mart supply chain. These 
investments likely include data management technology, human resources, and other physical 
capital devoted solely to serving the needs of this massive business partner (King and Phumpiu 
1996, 1182). This relationship has also certainly increased the frequency within Tyson’s supply 
chain. Though Wal-Mart is hardly a high-end retailer, enforcement of quality and safety 
measures are also likely to be much stricter in order to preserve this important relationship. 
Neither company has an interest in integrating into the other’s business, both know their limits. 
This then is indicative of the nature of upstream transactions in the food processing industry, 
characterized by very idiosyncratic assets, high frequency, and some measure of uncertainty in 
meeting powerful buyer demands through open market transactions. 
4.5   Predictions of Transaction Cost Economics 
4.5.1   Transaction Cost Economics’ Expectations of Acquisition 
 Given these general conditions within the sector, we can then draw some conclusions 
about what type of organization we would expect food processors to maintain. Transactions in 
the food processing industry are either common and frequent, or specific and occasional. Food 
processors hold key specialized assets in both sets of transactions, though the transactions 
themselves are generally not complex. These aspects would then lead us to expect the food 
processor to maintain an independent status in terms of firm boundaries.   
Some increase in the monitoring required for food products could lead to an increase in 
integration, but arms-length contracting should be sufficient in most regards (Lawrence et al. 
2001, 372). Even in extreme cases where product must be tested, this complexity could be 
handled through neoclassical or relational contracting. As technology improves testing and 
grading techniques, incentives to vertically integrate will further weaken (Barkema et al. 1991, 
33). There seems little economic reason why it would be cost effective for food processors to 
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undertake more intensive vertical coordination. The realistic assumption of diminishing returns 
to management suggests that the costs of organizing these activities internally will continue to 
rise, while the benefits in this industry seem negligible (Coase 1937, 394). Even in considering 
more restrictive forms of contracting, the costs seem to outweigh the potential benefits in many 
cases. This concept appears especially relevant to the food processor, as specifications are often 
contractually manifested at a threshold level, showing the exact point where costs of added detail 
equal costs of broken agreements. 
However, we can expect to see wide use of implicit contracts in this market. The name of 
the food manufacturing firm will signal quality to both retailers and consumers, and thus the 
unwillingness to shirk in terms of contract performance. Given the intense competition in the 
food processing industry, we might expect to see relatively small price premiums to ensure this 
performance (Klein and Leffler 1981, 622). Price premiums are effective in ensuring quality 
when they guarantee a positive income stream over the gains from a one time default. Yet, in a 
mature industry firms will compete and drive premiums down, leaving companies to find other 
ways in which to contend for market share. This will lead companies to undertake firm-specific 
capital investments in brand name or goodwill (Klein and Leffler 1981, 626). Sunk costs 
involved in building implicit contracts are important to the food processor. The average food 
processor has been in business for a long time, and in many cases these investments are already 
significant. Nevertheless, maintenance of these brand names and reputations will be key. These 
firms have, and will continue to require, large amounts of brand-name capital with which to bond 
themselves to the supply of safe foods. 
 We can then draw conclusions about the optimal firm organization within the food 
processing sector suggested by Transaction Cost Economics. The food processor engages in 
frequent transactions of common goods, but also infrequent transactions of costly and highly 
idiosyncratic assets. These infrequent capital purchases will seldom lead the food manufacturer 
to integrate into machinery production, although the nature of these transactions may lead 
processors to develop their own components in some instances. Even though overall industry 
exchange terms are not overly complex, meeting minimum standards is very important. These 
costs are allayed by the fact that food processors often have fixed brand-name investments acting 
as good faith bonds. We would thereby expect to see neoclassical or relational contracting, but 
little vertical integration into other stages of the food supply chain. Under this rationale, we 
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expect to observe an industry structure with little incentive to organize more transactions inside 
the firm. The basic tenets of Transaction Cost Economics are quite clear, the firm's boundaries 
will be expanded to the extent, and only to the extent, that it builds the value of the firm by 
minimizing on the costs of transactions with suppliers or buyers (Coase 1937, 390). In this 
industry, little value is expected to be created through expansion, but any acquisitions that occur 
should be special cases where firm profitability can be increased. 
4.5.2   Transaction Cost Economics’ Expectations of Capital Structure 
 Given the highly specific nature of some of the transactions and assets in this industry, 
we can also make some predictions about capital structure. There are a number of extremely 
costly and idiosyncratic assets involved in both upstream and downstream transactions. Given 
this characteristic, Transaction Cost Economics would predict an industry dominated by equity 
financing. This theory finds equity financing more intrusive, and thus where possible this form 
will not be chosen over the less invasive debt mechanism. Regardless, this equity dominated 
capital structure would be expected to persist in the food manufacturing industry, as it is the low-
cost form of financing under this theory.  
 With highly specific assets and considerable risk, bondholders would expect risk 
distortion in the food manufacturing firm’s decisions, and consequently having downside risk 
projected upon themselves. Investors would then factor this into their decisions, thereby 
demanding a higher yield on bonds issued by food processors. This should make debt more 
expensive, leading firms to opt for cheaper equity financing. The nature of financial transactions 
in this sector should make it such that equity would come with the lower overall costs, making it 
the dominant component of the food processing industry’s capital structure. Our a priori 
prediction would then be for more highly leveraged firms in this industry to have higher capital 
costs, and thus perform comparatively worse. 
4.6   Agency Theory in the Food Processing Industry 
    We now turn to Agency Theory to get a very different perspective about organization of 
the food processing industry. A key aspect in evaluating industry-specific agency conflict is the 
unique construction of monitoring and incentive schemes meant to assuage the agency problem. 
Within every complex firm where ownership and decision-making is not consolidated, there is 
some structure for both monitoring and incentives. In addition, several mechanisms also exist to 
apply discipline from outside the firm. These external arrangements also vary by industry, and 
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therefore we must understand the specific strengths and weaknesses of these forces within the 
food processing sector to obtain predictions from this theory.  
Yet, first we must discuss in detail several aspects of these systems that are especially 
relevant to the food manufacturing industry. The idea behind monitoring is that decision control 
and decision management should be separated within the firm (Fama and Jensen 1983, 304). 
This means that managers should have some sort of authoritative entity overseeing their 
decisions. The decision control function is then a cost born by shareholders to ensure that 
managers undertake appropriate actions. This task is usually undertaken by a compensated board 
of directors. Additional structures, such as “mutual monitoring systems” where managers 
monitor each other or “decision hierarchies” requiring a process of decision validation, will help 
ensure agents behave as desired (Fama and Jensen 1983, 310).  
Incentives most often come in the form of various compensation schemes. Performance-
based pay requires that the manager undertake certain actions in order to realize gains. 
Professional managers are economic actors, and incentives are a strong way of tying their 
welfare to those of the principles. The problem with incentives is not that they are ineffective, 
but rather that they are often too effective (Baker et al. 1988, 597). Caution must be used, as 
these systems are so powerful that the principle must be certain they are giving incentive for 
precisely what they desire accomplished. Another similar form of incentive that can be forced 
upon the manager is that of the managerial labor market. If managers desire promotion or simply 
a quality reference, they have reason not to tarnish their own reputations (Rosen 1990, 14). 
Agents can also be subject to incentives that invoke a sort of bonding action. This concept is a bit 
more evasive, but the idea is that the manager put up some sort of tangible or intangible bond 
that can be seized in the event of default on their managerial duties. Some suggestions of the 
form this might take include backloaded wages, benefit schemes, and vested option plans 
(Hutchens 1989, 61). Bonding can also have adverse effects, since at some point it may become 
desirable for the manager to actively pursue “golden parachutes” or other lucrative severance 
compensation.    
 If monitoring and incentives functioned perfectly, there would be no agency problem. 
The only losses would be costs associated with providing monitoring and incentive systems. Yet, 
there are almost always some residual losses from being unable to completely reconcile the 
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 308). In reality these tools are effective, but are 
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unable to fully rectify the agency conflict for numerous reasons. This contracting between 
principles and agents is ultimately imperfect like any other contract. Terms can never completely 
encompass the complexity of real world jobs, especially when services or multiple tasks are 
involved (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, 25). Job design is thus fundamental to applying any 
type of incentives or monitoring (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, 26). Incentives and monitoring 
may be powerful tools, but they must be designed and implemented very carefully in order not to 
do more damage than good. 
Monitoring schemes are subject to bias that makes them ineffectual through the very 
process by which they are constructed, let alone in their challenging implementation. The 
monitoring function is most often biased because it is subject to the influence of the managers of 
the firm. Boards are often chosen by the director’s slate put forth by top management. 
Compensated directors wishing to retain their positions will then have an incentive not to cause 
trouble for the management. In fact, the management can even affect directors’ compensation 
and perks. Hence, it is clear that directors will often have a reason to favor the current 
management team (Bebchuck and Fried 2003, 74). Thus, the effectiveness of monitoring begins 
to break down when management becomes entrenched or in some other manner gains a 
disproportionate amount of power within the firm.  
 Incentives can also be rendered ineffective. Pay-for-performance is the desirable 
compensation structure to encourage diligent effort. Of course, there are typically other 
components of executive pay that allow the manager to escape some employment risk. A base 
salary and incentive pay usually compose the management’s compensation, with a higher salary 
component being found in industries subject to a greater degree of risk (Garen 1994, 1177). The 
exact makeup of pay can be hard to determine, as pay can be camouflaged to a significant 
degree. This allows wages with very little incentive attached to be dispersed under complex 
compensation schemes that disguise components and levels of pay (Bebchuck and Fried 2003, 
76). Firms with poorly designed incentive systems will provide pay that is costly to the principle, 
both in terms of lower effort and wasted profits doled out as ineffective compensation. Under the 
influence of managerial power, executive pay may not be a way of addressing the agency 
problem, but rather a part of the problem itself (Bebchuck and Fried 2003, 72). 
 In combination with internal monitoring and incentives, the firm is also subject to some 
measure of external discipline. As we have discussed, the financial structure of the firm not only 
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contributes to the operation of the firm, but also to the way it is organized and managed 
(Sandberg et al. 1987, 15). Financial markets have incentive to monitor a company to the extent 
that they have a relevant stake in the firm. Thus, in addition to the type of financing present, the 
characteristics and concentration of investors are also extremely important factors (Demsetz and 
Lehn 1985, 1156). Larger institutional investors or persons with highly consolidated holdings 
will likely play a bigger role in the firm. These actors are certainly important in the monitoring 
and oversight they perform, but also in the sheer financial and voting clout they wield.  
The basic point is that organization of the firm to manage agency problems not only 
includes the within-firm guidelines created, but also has to do with the firm’s needs, obligations, 
and opportunities in the broader financial market. The governance applied by debt is nearly 
universal, but the discipline applied in equity markets will have a highly industry-specific aspect. 
Underperforming firms are ultimately subject to the market for corporate control, although more 
promptly in some sectors than others (Jensen 1986, 329). The opportunity for such outside 
discipline may be weakened by the construction of defensive measures such as litigation by 
target management, block stock repurchases, “poison pills”, and numerous other mechanisms 
used by entrenched executives (Jarrell et al. 1988, 63). Nonetheless, in cases of exceedingly poor 
management the financial markets will apply considerable discipline within any industry.  
For the most part, outside discipline originates in the financial markets, but some is 
applied by the presence of governmental regulation (Demsetz and Lehn 1985, 1161). In most 
sectors government regulation is not a major issue, but it does have an unusually strong impact 
on activities of food processors. Aside from basic market regulation by entities like the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), food processors are also subject to the specific regulations 
and standards of organizations such as the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyard 
Administration (GIPSA). These are powerful agencies that have significant influence over the 
actions of food processors. It then seems that the food manufacturing industry is subject to an 
additional measure of external discipline that other manufacturing sectors are not.  
Agency Theory certainly provides another very distinct vantage point from which to view 
organization of the food processing industry. The firm is not an individual, and thus determining 
the cause of this entity’s actions is far more complex, driven by the discipline to which the firm 
is subject. Both internal and external disciplinary forces are clearly influenced by specific 
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industry characteristics, although individual firm traits certainly play a major role as well. We 
will again find it beneficial to examine the food processing industry, breaking our analysis into 
more focused segments. Considering the Agency Theory approach and its predictions, discussion 
will be divided into “Internal” and “External” sources of discipline. The origins of these two 
types of discipline within the food processing industry are shown in figure 3. This partition will 
allow us to observe the array of industry factors coming into play in Agency Theory, and should 
help us understand the decision process of the food manufacturing firm. Knowledge of this 
process may then be used to make industry predictions about capital structure and expansion 
activity. 
Figure 5                                     Internal and External Sources of Discipline 
 
 
4.7   Internal Firm Discipline 
4.7.1   Monitoring 
 Food processors have gradually consolidated over time, with plant numbers falling and 
plant sizes growing (Connor and Schiek 1997, 91). Although approximately 16,000 food 
processors still exist in the US, the 50 biggest firms account for well over 50% of sales and 
control over 80% of the industry’s assets (Connor and Schiek 1997, 95). These major firms are 
almost invariably organized as corporations, because of significant financial needs in this capital-
intensive industry. Therefore, in food manufacturing we see an industry characterized by the 
separation of ownership from control, and a resulting susceptibility to internal agency conflict. 
 Ineffective monitoring systems seem likely to be a real problem in the food processing 
industry with its rather established management teams. Minority and management control, as 
defined by Berle and Means, are the industry standard (Berle and Means 1932, 75). Stagnant 
industry growth can also create situations where it is difficult to tell if the agent is performing. 
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Mature markets are ripe for agency problems, since it is hard to distinguish between sluggish 
management and sluggish industry performance. The food processing industry is certainly 
mature, as its basic domestic growth determinant is the mere 1% annual increase in US 
population (Weston and Chiu 1996, 1). Growth and profitability have been higher for pre-pared 
food and other “healthy” products, but overall expansion of the food manufacturing sector has 
been modest for decades.  This industry is reliably profitable, but growth expectations are not 
high, making it hard to monitor firms and distinguish poor management performance. 
 In addition, entrenchment and ineffective monitoring can be an even greater problem 
when founders or members of the founding family hold prominent positions (Morck 1988, 310). 
This, of course, is not an uncommon characteristic in the food manufacturing industry, with 
several founding families playing a role in food corporations that were once family businesses. 
Whether boards are relatively weaker in this industry is uncertain, but we find no evidence that 
these bodies are especially effective. Overall, we observe conditions in the food processing 
industry that typically lead to weak within-firm monitoring. These problems are inherent in many 
industries, and it is not clear by any means that food processors suffer from notoriously bad 
agency conflict. What is clear though, is that this industry is at least equally vulnerable to 
ineffective monitoring and the agency problems that result. 
4.7.2   Incentives 
 We have already addressed the presence of risk in the food processing industry. This 
sector is quite non-cyclical, but there are still considerable uncertainties. We correspondingly see 
a significant proportion of base salary pay in this industry, as opposed to compensation derived 
from performance. This will lead to weaker incentive systems in these firms, resulting in 
somewhat higher levels of agency costs. In addition, the use of options and other equity-based 
compensation is becoming increasingly prevalent in food processing, as has been true in nearly 
every industry in recent years. However, the incentives created by these measures are a perfect 
example of compensation that may not be overly effective. 
  “At the money” options can be repeatedly cashed out, forcing the principle to continually 
rebuild these incorrectly structured incentives. Options can be useful, but only when vested “out 
of the money”. This stipulates effort by agents to make options valuable, and does not entail 
principles having to continually pay to realign incentives (Bebchuck and Fried 2003, 86). 
Compared to say technology companies, the effectiveness of stock options is further diminished 
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in the food processing industry since their value will rarely increase quickly. Information on 
other performance pay structures is not easy to obtain, but again the important fact is that there is 
no indication that these schemes are extraordinarily successful within the food processing 
industry. With large firms organized in the typical corporate structure, there appears to be an at 
least average likelihood of ineffective incentive systems in this sector. Agency Theory would 
then predict agency costs to ensue for the food processor.  
4.7.3   Internal Discipline Example of Agency Theory  
An example from the food processing industry once again seems warranted. In keeping 
with our chicken processing example, we will again use Tyson Foods to illustrate these concepts. 
In terms of within-firm discipline, it does not seem that Tyson is different from many food 
processors. The firm’s CEO is John Tyson, grandson and namesake of founder John Tyson who 
started the company in 1935. The father of John Tyson, Don Tyson, sits on the board and 
currently holds 80.3% of the firm’s aggregate voting shares (SEC 2004). This is due in large part 
to the company’s dual-class stock structure, which allows the Tyson family almost unopposed 
control of the firm. Directors are elected through proxy votes, and the result should be no 
surprise given this distribution of voting power. On the nine member board, John, Don, and 
Barbara Tyson round out a well-represented Tyson family. We can then clearly expect to see 
some deficiencies and bias in the monitoring of this firm.  
In terms of incentives, Tyson executives are paid base salaries ranging from $475,000 to 
$993,000, with bonuses ranging from $240,000 to $2.5 million (SEC 2004). It can also be 
observed that options are used extensively in this firm, although likely somewhat ineffectively as 
they are vested at only 10% over face value for management. Executive officers as a group 
received over 3.1 million options in fiscal 2003, with John Tyson claiming a generous 1.6 
million of these (SEC 2004). Incentives then also appear to be relatively weak and significantly 
biased in this firm. It should be noted that the grouping of incentives, control, and ownership 
could diminish the agency problem to some extent in this case. However, outside stockholders 
have provided a large share of this company’s total capital, with little ability to assuage losses 
due to agency problems. Overall, this firm provides a perfect example of a food manufacturing 
company where agency conflict is likely due to ineffective or biased monitoring and incentives. 
Within-firm discipline is often hard to judge, but in the current example it is quite obvious that 
this food processor could face some very serious agency problems. 
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4.8   External Firm Discipline 
4.8.1   Financial Markets 
 In the food processing sector, outside discipline seems to be a somewhat stronger force 
than within-firm governance. The legal rights of debt holders in the food processing industry are 
the same as they are in every other sector. Yet, unusually strong discipline is applied to this 
industry through the equity mechanism. The reputation for food firms as “cash cows” makes 
them especially attractive for takeover attempts (Vickner 2001, 5). Food manufacturers are a 
non-cyclical group that pumps out a consistent amount of cash each year. As we have discussed, 
growth is likely to be sluggish in the food processing industry, resulting in stock prices that fail 
to meet the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500). This makes food processors prime targets 
for takeover attempts. Even within the industry itself, firms are constantly seeking growth 
through acquisition, and are always looking for bargains. It should then be no surprise that food 
processors are very prone to mergers and acquisitions, with between 3% and 6% of total assets 
changing hands per year (Connor and Schiek 1997, 113).  
4.8.2   Government 
Further intensifying external discipline for food manufacturers is the significant presence 
of governmental agencies in this sector. In most US industries governmental discipline is a 
minimal consideration, but this is clearly not the case throughout the food system. The 
government has undertaken the task of ensuring a safe and dependable food supply. The effect of 
this public policy on firms has been strict control of some activities. For the most part, this 
intervention is in place to protect the safety of the consuming public. Rules about food 
preparation or packaging are most common. Although this control often comes in the form of 
specific constraints on production methods, overall regulation of the market on behalf of 
producers or consumers is certainly not unheard of. Government rules and regulations then add a 
strict form of discipline to that already applied by financial markets. 
4.8.3   External Discipline Example of Agency Theory 
An example of outside discipline will once again be helpful, as we choose to further 
utilize our Tyson example. However, this time the effects transcend the chicken industry in 
scope. Tyson has been making inroads into the beef business for some time. In 1997, Tyson 
purchased a Nebraska-based beef packer called Hudson Foods. What is remarkable about this 
example is that it displays both of the main forms of external discipline facing food processors. 
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This example certainly shows the discipline applied by the market for corporate control. Hudson 
was making thin or negative margins producing ground beef for Burger King. The company was 
performing poorly, and powerful Tyson made an unsolicited offer to buy Hudson’s assets.  
Yet, what was perhaps more key in bringing about this acquisition was discipline applied 
by the government. A month after 15 people in Colorado became sick from E.coli contaminated 
meat, Hudson was forced to recall an incredible 25 million pounds of hamburger (CNNfn 1997). 
In addition, the offending plant was shut down by Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman until 
safety standards were met (CNNfn 1997). The move of pulling USDA inspectors from the plant 
was criticized by those at Hudson as being far too drastic. Yet, the damage was done, leaving 
Hudson with little alternative when Tyson made its play for the company several weeks later. 
Both the market for corporate control and federal intervention combined to doom Hudson. In this 
example, we can see how financial markets and governmental regulation can combine to provide 
governance for firms in the food manufacturing industry. 
4.9 Predictions of Agency Theory 
4.9.1   Agency Theory’s Expectations of Acquisition 
 Given this analysis of food processor characteristics, we can again make some 
predictions using organizational theory. We have seen that the food processing industry has the 
potential for agency problems, resulting from both the internal and external disciplines applied. 
We found the overall level of internal discipline to be relatively weak, but also determined 
external discipline to be a more serious consideration. Unexceptional internal monitoring and 
incentive systems, along with some mild discipline applied by the government and financial 
markets, will lead to some unusual types of expansion activity.  
  In a mature cash-rich industry like this one, especially with less than intense discipline 
being applied internally, we can expect to see traditional free cash flow agency problems. This 
industry trait will lead executives to undertake acquisitions for the purposes of “empire 
building”, to diversify their own employment risk, or to meet growth objectives in a stagnant 
market. At the whim of rebellious managers, many firm expansions in this particular industry 
will likely be unrelated acquisitions with little vertical or horizontal justification. These 
expansions will probably not be beneficial to the company, only serving to disperse management 
effort in areas where the firm does not have competencies.  
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 Yet, some considerable external discipline has been noted in this industry. We usually 
think of discipline as forcing managers to take the proper actions. Although the market for 
corporate control and governmental intercession are generally reserved for only the most 
egregious offenders, even in these cases external discipline might have an alternative effect. 
Food processing firms sometimes engage in types of defensive acquisitions to counter the power 
of competitors or companies looking to integrate (Harris et al. 2002, 6).These acquisitions may 
be last ditch actions of desperate management, rather than logically considered firm expansion. 
Though external discipline is a factor in the food processing industry, combined with weak 
internal governance it may have a detrimental effect.  
 In either of these cases, we witness firm expansion that is undesirable. Agency Theory 
certainly allows for productive firm expansions, but to the extent that they are not it indicates an 
agency problem. Overall, acquisition activity in the sector could still be value-creating. Yet, 
Agency Theory allows for, and even predicts, firm expansion in the food processing industry that 
is value-destroying.  
4.9.2   Agency Theory’s Expectations of Capital Structure  
Knowing the characteristics of this industry, we can also draw some conclusions about 
the capital structure we might expect to witness. There are tremendous economies of scale in 
food manufacturing, thus requiring substantial capital investments. For most processors, this 
burden would be unrealistic for any one person or small group to take on. Therefore, outside 
sources of funding should be absolutely vital to this industry. Considerable financial needs will 
make it efficient to secure outside investment, and hence to separate the management and 
ownership functions.  
While food manufacturing may not be the most complex industry, the process of creating 
consistent-quality food products on a large scale certainly takes some specific scientific 
knowledge. It is also clear from our industry discussion that risk will be a consideration. There 
then seem to be further gains from separating management from ownership here. Requirements 
of knowledge and capital, along with the risk inherent in this market, will make it efficient to 
have professional managers making educated and risk-neutral decisions on the behalf of outside 
investors.  
Given that professional management and outside investment appear necessary, it will 
then depend on the strength of the governance systems to determine what type of capital 
 
 
38 
structure is selected. In our discussion, we found nothing exceptionally strong about these 
systems in the food processing industry. Management will therefore choose the less restrictive 
financial form, and utilize a high proportion of equity. Much of the outside discipline in this kind 
of capital configuration is applied in the market for corporate control, but as we have mentioned 
this market generally targets only the most egregious offenders. Equity then often provides 
relatively weak governance, relying primarily on the internal structure of monitoring and 
incentives. When these systems are impotent, like they are in the food processing industry, 
significant agency losses will ensue. Some debt can still be expected, but Agency Theory would 
predict its presence only in firms with stronger internal governance. In sum, Agency Theory 
clearly anticipates an equity-based capital structure in the food processing industry, but with 
some debt still used as a mechanism to improve performance by alleviating agency losses. 
4.10   Comparing Predictions to the Observed Food Processing Industry 
 How then do these theoretical predictions compare to what we see in the US food 
processing industry? We will undertake only a brief overview, but both paradigms make some 
accurate predictions. In terms of capital structure, food processors use a large amount of equity 
financing, with generally around 70% of total assets being financed in this manner (Vickner 
2001, 3). However, it is not clear why this type of financing is the preferred one. Since both 
theories make the same prediction about capital structure, it is very hard to determine which best 
explains the reasons for this outcome. Measurement of the effects from different capital structure 
choices will have to be undertaken to draw any conclusions about these theories. 
 The picture becomes even more muddled in terms of acquisition activity. Transaction 
Cost Economics predicts an industry where vertical integration is unlikely, but contracting is 
important. In 1996 37% of farm output was purchased through either market or production 
contracts, while only 8% was produced under vertical integration (Harris et al. 2002, 4). In the 
downstream market this theory seems quite strong, but in the upstream market it is nearly 
impossible to determine. Information on the specifics of these arrangements is closely guarded, 
and almost impossible to obtain. However, it does seem quite likely that even less integration is 
present in upstream transactions, although contracting could be far greater. Transaction Cost 
Economics seems to correctly predict little justification for further firm expansion, as we can 
observe the number of acquisitions falling substantially in recent years (Harris et al. 2002, 4). 
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Frank and Henderson even find empirical evidence that transaction costs are a primary 
motivation for coordination in US food industries (Frank and Henderson 1992, 941). 
 Nevertheless, there is also some support for the merit of Agency Theory in explaining 
food processor acquisition activity. Weston and Chiu find that related acquisitions in the 
aggregate food industry build value, while unrelated acquisitions do not (Weston and Chiu 1996, 
5). Bhuyan even specifically studies the vertical integration of food processors, finding a 
negative impact on firm value that leads him to the belief that these expansions fail to create 
efficiency gains (Bhuyan 2002, 72). These studies uncover persuasive evidence of agency costs 
associated with firm expansion. Such findings seem to support the ideas of Agency Theory, 
while presenting value-destroying acquisition activity that strongly contradicts the tenets of 
Transaction Cost Economics.  
 The literature on acquisitions in the food processing industry is unclear. Cotterill even 
suggests that there is a significant need for further vertical coordination in wholesale markets to 
increase overall performance (Cotterill 2001, 35). The literature is more divided over 
acquisitions than capital structure, perhaps because financial principles have been overlooked 
within agricultural economics. At any rate, neither capital structure nor acquisition activity are 
truly understood in any economic discipline, and this is because economists do not have a solid 
understanding of the organizational principles that guide these choices. This is the task upon 
which we now embark.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Empirical Analysis 
5.1   Outline of the Experiment 
 The contrast is quite apparent between the Transaction Cost Economics approach to 
organizational decision-making, and the just dispelled Agency Theory perspective. It is clear that 
both theoretically explain some of the decisions that we see in the real world, but they do so in 
very different ways. Both concepts are relevant within the economy to some degree. However, 
the divergence in these theories concerning the determinants of capital structure and firm 
expansion is glaring. Throughout this paper we have established theoretical predictions about 
these aspects for the food processing industry. These contrasts are observable in the industry 
today, and can then be examined empirically to determine which theory has greater explanatory 
power for this sector.  
Differences in acquisition activity and capital structure between firms can easily be 
obtained from accounting data. Using these differences, we can examine how these coincide with 
the performance organizational theory would suggest.  To this end, a quantitative measure of 
firm performance is needed. The US securities market provides this resource, embodying 
performance information for nearly all large food manufacturers. Using measures of capital 
structure, acquisitions, and historical performance in the equity markets, we can test which 
paradigm more nearly predicts where value will be created. In observing these relationships in a 
cross-section of food processing firms, we can then examine the crucial question of which 
organizational model explains the actions of food manufacturers.  
5.2   Data Collection and Sample Characteristics  
Our empirical analysis will be built on the basic tenets of equity markets that are efficient 
in at least the semi-strong form (Fama 1970, 414). Hence, we assume that capital markets are 
functioning properly, and thus seek to extract some of the wealth of information that exists 
therein. We use observed capital structure and acquisition activity to test these organizational 
paradigms through a cross-sectional financial study. Data on a sample of firms were derived 
from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT database, with firms selected by Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) codes as being those involved in food processing. Firms were utilized from 
the food and kindred products manufacturing sector (SIC 20--), representing companies that 
process food or beverages.  
 
 
41 
For these firms, relevant data was compiled for the period from 1999 to 2002. A major 
challenge in this study was deciding how to construct accurate cross-sections over this period. A 
cross-section is a sample with a number of observational units all drawn at the same moment in 
time (Green 2003, 878). Yet, companies issue annual reports at various times of the year. Thus, 
using a calendar year would clearly not provide an appropriate cross-section. The correct 
specification of the time period was determined to be the compilation interval for which data will 
be used by firms to make strategic choices, and by investors to evaluate prior decisions. Data 
from calendar years may reveal statistically significant relationships, but is ultimately irrelevant 
to the operation of the firm. Fiscal years seemed to most closely coincide with our requirements, 
and as such data was gathered on this basis. We utilize the COMPUSTAT convention of defining 
the fiscal year as the calendar year in which the majority of the months covered in an annual 
report occurred. In the end, this choice is possibly no better at aligning our cross-section at a 
common point in time, but if the fiscal year is the period by which firms make decisions, it is 
then clearly the relevant unit for analyzing economic organization.   
Our food processing firms were then filtered for those that were listed on either the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotation System (NASDAQ). Information should be fully captured within security prices in 
these markets, as opposed to more thinly traded exchanges like the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX). This process yielded an initial sample of 117 large, widely-traded food processing 
companies. 34 firms were eliminated for not being actively traded over the entire four year 
period. In addition, several firms had missing data within the COMPUSTAT archive. The US 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Electronic Data Gathering, and Retrieval system 
(EDGAR) was used to find absent figures. Two foreign-based firms had missing values that 
could not be rectified using EDGAR, and one domestic firm had inadequate cash flow 
statements. These companies were subsequently dropped from the sample. In the end, a balanced 
panel of data on 80 firms was found and utilized in this analysis. The SIC codes represented in 
the final sample, along with two example firms from each, are shown in table 1. 
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Table 1 
Final Sample: SIC Codes and Example Firms 
SIC CODE Description Example Firms
2011 Meat Packing Plants -Hormel Foods                  -Tyson Foods
2013 Sausages & Other Prepared Meats -Bridgeford Foods*
2015 Poultry Slaughter & Processing -Pilgrims Pride                   -Sanderson Farms
2020 Dairy Products -Bravo Foods Intl                 -Lucille Farms
2024 Ice Cream & Frozen Desserts -Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream         -Hibernia Foods
2030 Canned, Frozen, & Preserved Fruit, Veg & Food Specialties
-Campbell Soup                 
-Gardenburger
2033 Canned, Fruits, Veg, Preserves, Jams, and Jellies
-Hanover Foods                 
-Smucker (JM)
2040 Grain Mill Products -Kellogg                        -Penford
2050 Bakery Products -Interstate Bakeries               -Tasty Baking
2052 Cookies & Crackers -Lance*
2060 Sugar & Confectionary Products -Cadbury Schweppes             -Hershey Foods
2070 Fats & Oils -Archer Daniels Midland           -Omega Protein
2080 Beverages -Pure World*
2082 Malt Beverages -Anheuser Busch                 -Coors
2084 Wine, Brandy & Brandy Spirits -Chalone Wine Group             -Golden St Vintners
2085 Distilled & Blended Liqour -Brown Forman                  -Diageo
2086 Bottled & Canned Soft Drinks & Carbonated Waters
-Coca-Cola Enterprises            
-Pepsi Americas
2090 Miscellaneous Food Preparations & Kindred Products
-Monterey Pasta                 
-Starbucks
 
 
5.3   Data Issues 
The COMPUSTAT database then readily produced a large and nearly complete sample of 
food manufacturing firms. Unfortunately, there has been a well documented possibility of 
generating bias by employing this resource. It has been suggested that use of the COMPUSTAT 
database may cause ex-post selection bias in choosing larger or only publicly traded firms (Jaffe 
et al. 1989, 136). All food processors are certainly not publicly traded corporations, and thus we 
may have an unrepresentative sample. Yet, additional bias has also been proposed by financial 
economists. Selection bias has been a suggested result of COMPUSTAT choosing to list firms 
Source: Standard and Poor’s. COMPUSTAT: North America. (October 2003). 
Note: * denotes only firm with this SIC code in final sample 
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only after several years of data can be collected (Banz and Breen 1986, 779). Similarly, survival 
bias may be incurred due to failing firms being dropped from the database (Kothari et al. 1995, 
204). Thus, the resulting COMPUSTAT archive is restricted to firms that are currently viable, 
and have been so for several periods. To these problems, further bias may occur in relation to the 
time period selection problems that we have already discussed. Look-ahead bias is a dating 
problem, wherein data reported at a certain time may not actually be available to investors until a 
later period (Banz and Breen 1986, 780). This would create substantial bias in the relationships 
between these measures and the firm’s returns.  
Several remedies have been suggested for these problems, such as merged databases that 
help dispel selection and survival problems, or by confining analysis to firms with similar fiscal 
years to eliminate timing issues. However, such alternatives may not always be possible or 
appropriate. Neither remedy is viable in our case, as arbitrary exclusion of part of the sample or 
discretionary timing assumptions cannot be used in conjunction with an asset pricing model 
(Banz and Breen 1986, 792). In the end, the severity of these sources of bias is even a point of 
some contention. We have consequently used the COMPUSTAT data, believing our sample to 
be generally representative of the food processing industry, and that any persisting bias is quite 
minimal. 
5.4   Model Specification 
5.4.1   Base Model Selection  
 The basic model specification for this study was drawn directly from the substantial body 
of literature devoted to financial economics. A specification was desired that would be 
theoretically appealing, while also allowing for examination of organizational theory. Two main 
opinions dominate the financial discipline today concerning the specification of models 
exploring the cross-section of expected stock returns. The first position supports a “capital asset 
pricing model” based on the work of Sharpe, Merton, and others. This model is based on the use 
ofβ , and is grounded in the fundamental relationship between risk and return. The second 
viewpoint has emerged in very recent years with the innovative work of Fama and French, 
respectively favoring an “empirical asset pricing model”. This approach is based on the observed 
success of alternative measures, such as book-to-market ratios, in explaining returns. The current 
debate over this issue in finance is rather heated, with strong empirical support existing for both 
positions.  
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 In this study, we have chosen a general “capital asset pricing model” for its theoretically 
appealing, somewhat intuitive nature. However, it should be noted that a Fama and French 
“empirical asset pricing model” was also constructed in conjunction with the preferred 
specification. The Fama and French model is based on the use of market-to-book ratios and 
market values to explain stock returns. These measures were also readily available in the 
COMPUSTAT database, and thus an alternate specification was straightforward. The results 
have not been reported, but the reader should simply note that the two specifications performed 
similarly. For our sample, the explanatory power of the Fama and French model was not quite as 
consistent, although signs on the parameter estimates of our organizational variables were nearly 
identical. This then gives credence to our examination of economic organization, but does little 
to settle the debate over proper specification for cross-sections of expected stock returns.  
5.4.2   Asset Pricing Theory 
We have chosen an Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) as the 
appropriate theoretical basis for our study. The foundation for this type of model is the original 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of William Sharpe, which addresses the issues of risk and 
return in investment. This theory states that the prices of assets will adjust so that assets with 
higher systematic risk will have higher expected returns (Sharpe 1964, 440). The measure of this 
systematic risk is an asset or portfolio’s marketβ , which is the parameter estimate obtained 
when regressing a particular investment’s returns against those of the market (or commonly a 
market index). Prices will then adjust until there is a linear relationship between the magnitude of 
theseβ ’s and expected returns for all investments, thus forming the theoretical “capital market 
line” (Sharpe 1964, 434). Hence, if trying to explain the returns on a security in the CAPM, all 
we should need is the marketβ , since all other risk would be diversifiable. This means a simple 
econometric form for the CAPM can be written as in equation (1), where E RJ( ) is asset J’s 
expected return, RF  is the risk-free rate, λJ M  is the market (M) risk premium, and ε  is a 
random error component. 
( ) ( )1 E R RJ F J M J M= + +β λ ε  
However, inconsistencies with this highly theoretical model have been noted on countless 
occasions. This is where the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) becomes 
appealing. The ICAPM is simply an extension of the CAPM put forth by Robert Merton, 
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allowing for shifts in the investment opportunity set over time (Merton 1973, 868). The 
intertemporal investor will take account of relationships between current returns and those 
available in the future, subsequently hedging against these effects (Merton 1973, 870). This 
means that investors recognize other factors affecting the riskiness of an asset, and will 
incorporate these into their investment decisions. Elements having a covariance with expected 
future returns will then be factored into the risk premium demanded. A basic econometric 
specification for the ICAPM can be observed in equation (2), whereβ ’s andλ ’s are the 
sensitivities and premiums associated with intertemporal risk factors N, O, and P. 
( ) ( )2 E R RJ F J M J M J N J N J O J O J P J P= + + + + +β λ β λ β λ β λ ε  
5.4.3    Variable Selection and Compilation 
The ICAPM then allows for additional factors besidesβ  to be incorporated into the 
model as long as they are correlated with changes in the investment opportunity set (Brennan et 
al. 2003, 1). Of course, we could never hope to capture all the considerations on the minds of 
investors, but prior empirical research provides two measures that act as excellent proxies for 
many general effects. In the literature, market value and price-to-earnings ratios can add to the 
explanation of a firm’s stock returns (Cook and Rozeff 1984, 464). The size effect, represented 
by a firm’s market value of equity, has been found to be a strong force in explaining cross-
sectional returns as a proxy for other factors involved (Fama and French 1992, 452). In the same 
way, price-to-earnings ratios have been suggested as a catch-all for omitted risk factors (Basu 
1977, 672). These alternative measures should capture intertemporal risk effects that may not be 
inherent inβ . With these additional variables, we have the basis for an ICAPM to explain food 
processor performance in the equity market. 
Once this basic specification had been determined, data on all variables was gathered 
from the COMPUSTAT archive. The standard form of the dependant variable in this type of 
study is the average returns for a stock, either at the monthly or yearly level. We have followed 
this methodology, using monthly closing prices provided by COMPUSTAT to construct yearly 
averages of the month-to-month percentage price changes in each stock, a variable we will refer 
to as AVPC. Our other basic independent variables were also gathered at the monthly level from 
this database, but some of these had to be put in an annual form comparable to our dependent 
variable. COMPUSTAT provides monthlyβ  values measuring the sensitivity of a company’s 
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stock price to movements in the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500). Yet, annual values 
have the advantage of decreasing the stability problems often associated withβ  and other proxies 
for risk (Harrington 1983, 80). A simple yearly average was then taken of the monthlyβ  values, 
while the January market value (MV) was believed to be sufficient to capture the size effect in a 
given year.  
However, gathering the price-to-earnings ratios was not as simple. COMPUSTAT 
provides monthly price-to-earnings ratios, but these ratios are not defined in the database when 
earnings are negative. Were these even available, negative price-to-earnings ratios would pose 
serious problems for econometric analysis. Yet, exclusion of poorly performing firms would 
almost certainly cause serious bias, especially since companies with negative earnings composed 
approximately 20% of our sample on a yearly basis. Commonly, these offending observations 
are simply put into a separate portfolio (Basu 1977, 665). In other studies, a dummy variable has 
been incorporated for these observations (Lakonishok 1994, 1558). Our sample is much too 
small for the first alternative, and we favored simply inverting these ratios to the option of 
adding dummy variables. Thus, our price-to-earnings ratios were flipped, and data was collected 
for those firms realizing losses.  
Earnings-to-price ratios (or earnings yields) were then utilized in our analysis, rather than 
price-to-earnings ratios. This method has been used in numerous studies, most often with a good 
deal of success (Jaffe et al. 1989, 138; Cook and Rozeff 1984, 455). Logically, there now can be 
a linear relationship in the earnings-to-price variable, regardless of the sign on earnings. 
Furthermore, there is no reason why a simple inverse should not still capture the risk effects that 
we seek in specifying this variable. Yet, it has been suggested that price-to-earnings and market 
value may be correlated, as they are both scaled versions of price (Fama and French 1992, 428). 
This possibility was investigated by finding the correlation of market value and our new earnings 
yield variable. The earnings-to-price variable was also averaged for the fiscal year, but 
collinearity between these two variables does not appear to be a problem in the data, even after 
aggregation. Earnings yields were subsequently added to our model as the EP variable, and 
formed one of the final elements of our base ICAPM specification. 
5.4.4   Other Base Model Specification 
 It is common in financial analysis to divide companies into portfolios. Size,β , or other 
measures can be used to separate firms into groups that are more comparable in terms of the 
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independent variables (Fama and French 1992, 430). However, we have not done this for two 
main reasons. First, it seems infeasible to create groups having any kind of statistical meaning 
with a sample of this size. Secondly, we are already using similar firms in the food processing 
industry, and as such these firms represent a single possible grouping. Some substantial 
differences in firm size and product characteristics will certainly persist, but overall it seems that 
this sample already forms an adequate portfolio.  
 Nevertheless, it is quite true that lumping firms into a “food processor” category by the 
broad SIC manufacturing sector (the first two digits of the code) is not a highly discerning 
approach, as many very different product sub-sectors exist within this broad classification. To 
partially correct for this weakness, dummy variables were included in the model. These dummy 
variables were constructed to group companies by full SIC code into more precise business 
segments within the larger food processing sector. Eight such variables were constructed, with 
the excluded group containing a combination of those firms in the SIC 2090 “Miscellaneous” 
and SIC 2070 “Fats and Oils” categories, for which no other suitable groupings could be found. 
These dummy variables are listed in table 2.  
Table 2 
Dummy Variables 
Name Description
DDAIRY Dairy Products
DFVJJ Fruit, Vegatable, Jellies or Jams
DBPCC Bakery Products, Cookies, or Crackers
DSUGAR Sugar or Confectionary
DBEV Malt or Other Beverages
DWBL Wine, Brandy, or Liqour
DSFTDR Soft Drinks
DMEAT Meat Processing or Packing
 
 
5.5   Theoretic Organizational Variables 
 To this base specification, we added the variables with which we hoped to empirically 
investigate the organization of the food processing industry. The very nature of cross-sectional 
studies allowed for this. Even after specifying the basic ICAPM model with dummy variables, 
there was still a large amount of unexplained variation in the dependant variable. This is almost 
always the case in cross-sections of stock returns. We were then not simply adding extraneous 
variables to an already true model, but rather such theoretical variables could serve to explain 
 Note: Various combinations of full SIC codes were used by the author  
 to form each of these business segments  
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some of the randomness of price movements. It was hoped that these variables would 
successfully account for at least some small portion of this remaining white noise, and thus 
provide some insight into the organizational structure of the food processing industry. 
 To analyze organizational theory, we selected three measures to proxy for elements of 
capital structure and firm expansion. Specifically, we utilized discounted free cash flow over 
debt (CFD), the relative debt-to-equity ratio (RDE), and acquisitions as a percent of firm market 
value (PAQ). CFD and RDE were selected as being representative of firm capital structure, while 
PAQ embodies firm expansion activity. We then sought to add these variables to our ICAPM in 
order to investigate the organizational underpinnings of the food processing industry. 
 Data on these variables was available within the COMPUSTAT database, but once again 
some manipulation was required. CFD was available on a yearly basis, but this ratio was 
undefined for those firms that had no debt. We again chose to invert this measure, ultimately 
using a ratio of debt-to-free cash flow that we will call DCF. RDE was taken directly from the 
database, but some calculation was also required for our PAQ variable. This measure was found 
by simply taking yearly acquisitions in dollars, and dividing by the company’s market value. 
With these steps completed, we then had a full panel of organizationally pertinent data for the 80 
firms in our sample. The full model estimated for each year T is then depicted in equation (3), 
with the entire set of dummy variables and their parameter estimates represented by DV. 
( )  AVPC MV EP DCF RDE PAQ DVT T T T T T T3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6= + + + + + + + + +α α β α α α α α ε  
Yearly descriptive statistics for the variables in this model are presented in table 3. 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Final Sample 
   Fiscal 1999      Fiscal 2000     Fiscal 2001      Fiscal 2002  
Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation
AVPC 0.01859 0.03791 0.02190 0.10083 0.01080 0.04433 0.00112 0.05676
0.63665 0.85475 0.50695 0.66278 0.48351 0.52827 0.42549 0.41347
MV         
in millions $
2,185 5,945.21 2,516.88 6,491.13 2,711.78 7,169.70 2,746.17 6,600.17
EP 0.00324 0.23954 -0.12739 0.65562 -0.23665 1.36324 -0.73159 5.64736
DCF 0.03112 0.39297 -0.06978 1.12872 0.06658 0.47989 0.03100 0.27031
RDE 0.50188 2.92673 0.45671 1.64905 0.67846 5.73940 2.48883 9.02364
PAQ 0.03321 0.08813 0.02393 0.07813 0.05274 0.15072 0.02270 0.10601
β
 
Source: Author’s calculations from Standard and Poor’s. COMPUSTAT: North America. (October 2003). 
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5.6   Theoretic Variable Expectations 
Before we discuss our model results, we can make some ex-ante predictions about each 
of these organizational variables under both theories. We have already discussed the expectations 
of both of these theories in determining capital structure and firm boundaries. In addition, we 
have discussed the specific characteristics of the food processing industry relevant to these 
organizational paradigms. Thus, we can now use our organizational predictions about the capital 
structure and firm expansion decisions of food manufacturers to redefine our original null 
hypotheses in terms of these chosen theoretic variables.  
Under the tenets of Transaction Cost Economics, we would expect that the effect of an 
increase in the ratio of debt-to-free cash flow (DCF) would only have a negative impact on firm 
value. This measure will rise only with an increase in firm debt or with a decrease in free cash 
flow. In an industry with highly specific assets like this one, an increase in debt would be very 
costly. On the other hand, less cash flow would only suggest fewer investment opportunities, and 
thereby decreased value for the firm. Thus, Transaction Cost Economics predicts a negative 
relationship between DCF and average monthly returns (AVPC). Likewise, Transaction Cost 
Economics suggests that specificities will cause an increase in the relative proportion of debt 
within the capital structure to decrease firm value. This means there should be a negative 
correlation between RDE and AVPC. Finally, Transaction Cost Economics suggests that 
acquisitions should always have a positive effect on firm value, even in industries like food 
processing where there appears little justification. This theory then predicts a positive 
relationship between our PAQ variable and AVPC. 
Our expectations under Agency Theory are a bit different. In terms of the ratio of debt-to-
free cash flow (DCF), this theory would predict a positive effect on firm returns. An increase in 
this ratio means the company either has more debt bonding management’s activities, or less free 
cash flow for management to squander. Such a change will have a favorable effect in sectors like 
food manufacturing, sectors that are relatively vulnerable to agency conflict. This means Agency 
Theory conversely predicts a positive correlation between DCF and AVPC. The relative debt-to-
equity ratio (RDE) could also be expected to have an opposite effect under the Agency Theory 
paradigm. An increase in RDE should increase shareholder value through stronger financial 
discipline, resulting in a positive correlation between RDE and AVPC. Finally, acquisitions with 
a positive effect are certainly possible under Agency Theory, but this paradigm does allow for 
 
 
50 
firm expansions that destroy value. The nature of the food processing industry might lead us to 
expect some acquisitions that do not create value for shareholders, due to the unexceptional 
governance of these firms. In experimentation, we would then allow PAQ to take either sign 
under Agency Theory, although somewhat anticipating a negative relationship with AVPC. 
Using these predictions, we can return to describe our original null hypotheses much 
more explicitly. These hypotheses can now be presented in terms of the chosen theoretic 
variables. The null hypothesis concerning capital structure was that Transaction Cost Economics 
accurately explained these choices, as shown in equations (4) and (5). Similarly, the null 
hypothesis regarding firm expansion was that Transaction Cost Economics correctly described 
this activity, as in equation (6). 
( ) H DCF
H RDE
( )  H  PAQ
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One possible alternative to these traditional assumptions is Agency Theory. Hypotheses for 
capital structure are given in equations (7) and (8), while acquisition is depicted in equation (9). 
 ( ) H DCF
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Clearly, these hypotheses offer a test of which theory better describes the actual food processing 
industry. Using these hypotheses, we now set out to determine which organizational paradigm is 
relevant to food manufacturers. 
5.7   Statistical Procedures 
 The possibility of multicollinearity was investigated by examining the correlation among 
the independent variables. This matter is always a concern, but was especially worrying with the 
use of debt in two of these variables. Yet, with no serious relationships over the years of this 
sample being found, multicollinearity was not considered to be an issue in this data, and was 
consequently ignored. This model was then estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression in the SAS system.  
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 Heteroskedasticity was found to be a problem in this data, and was correspondingly 
addressed using the Harvey Two-Step Method (Greene 2003, 233). The log of the squared 
residuals was collected from the original OLS regression. The independent variables were then 
regressed on these residuals for each year, with statistically significant parameter estimates (at 
the 0.10 level) being multiplied by the value of the respective independent variable for each 
observation. These figures were then summed, and the exponent taken. The square root of the 
resulting measure then served as a weight for correcting multiplicative heteroskedasticity. A 
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimation was then conducted, yielding the results in table 4. 
Table 4 
Full ICAPM Parameter Estimates 
Fiscal 1999 Fiscal 2000 Fiscal 2001 Fiscal 2002
Intercept
-.01082        
(.2840)
.01277         
(.1451)
-.00019772     
(.9852)
-.01823        
(.1319)
.00643     
(.3608)        
.010179     
(.1722)
.01455*     
(.0683)
.00459     
(.6069)
MV        
x 100,000   
-.0976     
(.0054)     
-.02287     
(.4235)
-.04287     
(.4536)
.02387     
(.5520)
EP
    -.10101***   
(.0006) 
   -.10535***   
(<.0001)
   -.02463***   
(<.0001)
  -.00180**     
(.0232)
DCF       
x 10
.0478        
(.6317)
-.0023956     
(.9324)
-.0411     
(.6499)
   .5181***     
(<.0001)
RDE        
x 1,000     
  .02405*     
(.0839)
-.01664     
(.7117)
.00662     
(.3562)
   .01997***    
(.0001)
PAQ
-.02967     
(.4767)
.03799     
(.3288)
.02978     
(.3275)
   .17946***    
(.0002)
DDAIRY
.02084     
(.1677)
-.00328     
(.8066)
-.01103     
(.4960)
  .08963**     
(.0435)
DFVJJ
    .04495***    
(.0011)
.01736     
(.1339)
.00388     
(.7966)
-.01325     
(.4443)
DGRAIN
    .04990***    
(.0009)
.00887     
(.4828)
-.02712     
(.1469)
-.00433     
(.8133)
DBPCC
.10568     
(.3575)
.12698     
(.2279)
.02143     
(.1973)
.03015     
(.1032)
DSUGAR
  .02331*     
(.0765)
.00250     
(.8289)
-.00000760     
(.9996)
-.01015     
(.1881)
DBEV
   .02610**     
(.0438)
  .02223*     
(.0556)
.00131     
(.9313)
-.01604     
(.3540)
DWBL
   .02785**     
(.0344)
.01208     
(.2920)
.01269     
(.4093)
-.01704     
(.0309)
DSFTDR
.05851     
(.1515)
.04781     
(.1942)
  -.02717*     
(.0840)
.01613     
(.3242)
DMEAT
  .02588*     
(.0918)
.00426     
(.7344)
.00175     
(.9167)
-.00622     
(.7205)
Model      
F-statistic
    2.44***     3.12***     5.66***     5.17***
0.3634 0.4224 0.5700 0.5480
β
R 2
Note: p-values in parenthesis, * denotes significance at the 0.10 level, ** denotes 
significance at the 0.05 level, *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level
 
 
52 
5.8   ICAPM Performance 
 Four separate regressions were undertaken on this set of companies, one for each of the 
years in our sample. Some differences were found, but overall the results are fairly robust. An 
important initial result was that the basic ICAPM specification performs quite well. In all four 
yearsβ  takes the expected positive sign, though only once becoming statistically significant at 
the 0.10 level. The fact thatβ  is always positive is reassuring, although its lack of significance 
might be worrisome. However, this is an acceptable result in the ICAPM model, asβ  is a useful 
explanatory variable, but certainly does not explain the entire movement of securities’ prices 
(Merton 1973, 868).  
 This fact seems obvious here, as our proxy variables from the financial literature perform 
much better. The expectation for the market value variable (MV) is not extremely clear, but a 
negative relationship has traditionally been suggested due to the notion that larger firms will 
have slower growth prospects in the future. Yet, the real purpose of this variable was to identify 
broad trends in the market affecting firms of various sizes in different ways. Our results show 
that market value is negative in three years, but is statistically significant only once, at the 0.01 
level during fiscal 1999. Unarguably, the MV variable is only mildly effective at picking up 
these broader market trends in our regressions, but the same cannot be said for the earnings yield 
variable.  
 Our ex-ante prediction for the sign on the earnings-to-price variable (EP) is positive, 
suggesting that a stock with a higher earnings yield would signal value, and could therefore 
expect superior equity price growth in the future. The parameter estimates on this variable are 
significant at the 0.05 level during all four years, but with the surprising result that signs are 
negative in all cases. Given the consistency of this result, this finding must be more than a simple 
aberration, but it does require some explanation. Upon considering this outcome, it becomes 
apparent the sign may not be unreasonable.  
 Lakonishok et al. classify such low-value investments as being “glamour” assets, based 
on the extrapolation of past growth in earnings (Lakonishok et al. 1994, 1542). In most sectors, 
this “tagging along” in the market is an ill-advised strategy, but this tactic appears effective in 
the food processing industry. However, throughout much of this paper we have discussed the 
importance of reputation and brand names in the food industry. With little growth in this sector 
from which to extrapolate, it seems that the profitable strategy is to invest in well established 
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companies. As we have discussed, firms with substantial brand-equity will likely have less risk 
and greater opportunity in the food manufacturing industry. It then seems logical that this is one 
case where the “glamour” strategy of investing in reputable firms trumps the typical “value” 
strategies of contrarian investors (Lakonishok et al. 1994, 1575).   
 The market value and earnings yield variables should capture many of the broader market 
trends occurring in these four years. Changes in these variables may represent concerns about 
food safety, economies of scale, or numerous other factors. The dummy variables in this model 
also pick up some substantial industry effects across this period. Several of these variables are 
statistically significant during different years, representing unique industry changes that 
occurred. Given the acceptable performance ofβ , EP, MV and the dummy variables, it appears 
that we have controlled for many of the risk effects in this industry, allowing us to properly 
examine our organizational variables. 
5.9   Yearly Findings 
 Each yearly model performs quite well, as all four are statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. With respective R2 values of 0.36, 0.42, 0.57, and 0.54, our four yearly cross-sections from 
1999 to 2002 explain a substantial portion of the variation in average monthly equity returns 
(AVPC). The earlier years are noticeably weaker in their explanatory power, but all four years 
perform relatively well for such cross-sectional regressions. Yet, the overall strength of these 
results is what we would expect, given the use of this traditionally effective financial model for 
explaining stock returns. The ICAPM is a rather flexible model, and has consequently been 
successful in numerous circumstances (Brennan et al. 2003, 25). Perhaps most importantly, the 
theoretically intuitive signs and general significance of the basic ICAPM specification give us 
added confidence in our results concerning the experimental variables within this model.  
 In examining these results, it must be remembered that there is little prior empirical 
support for any of these theoretic variables being related to firm performance. Acquisitions have 
been researched, but not often in this type of study. The collection of results on this subject is 
also quite ambiguous, providing little guidance for this variable. Work has been done using debt-
to-equity ratios in financial cross-sections, finding this ratio to have a positive effect on firm 
returns as a proxy for risk or other inexplicable premiums (Bhandari 1988, 527). However, no 
work has been conducted using the free cash flow-to-debt ratio, much less the inverse of this 
figure that we employ here. No consistent relationship has been found between any of these 
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variables and firm performance. Moreover, it appears that none of these measures have been 
explicitly applied to a food industry. We then had no ex-ante convictions for any of these 
variables, but it was hoped that, when used with the established base specification, these 
variables would have a discernable effect on firm performance and could shed some light on the 
organization of food manufacturers. 
5.9.1   Fiscal 1999 
 The model for fiscal 1999 is the worst overall performer of any in the sample period, with 
a model F-statistic that is significant at the 0.01 level, but is only 2.44. In this year, the dominant 
variables are earnings yield and market value, both becoming significantly negative at the 0.01 
level. Other statistically significant variables during this year include the DFVJJ, DGRAIN, 
DSUGAR, DBEV, DWBL, and DMEAT dummy variables, all of which are positive and 
significant at the 0.10 level or greater. One of our theoretical variables is statistically significant 
in this year, the relative debt-to-equity variable (RDE). The coefficient on this variable is 
positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The PAQ variable is negative in this case, 
but is not significant at any reasonable level. The estimate on the DCF variable is positive, but is 
also not significant. Though perhaps not as convincing as we might hope, the signs on these 
organizational variables are exactly what Agency Theory would predict. This fact, combined 
with the significantly positive effect of debt on firm returns, must lend some initial support to the 
validity of Agency Theory in this industry. 
5.9.2   Fiscal 2000 
 Our model results become a bit stronger in fiscal 2000, as the F-statistic now increases to 
3.12. The negative earnings yield variable once again dominates this model, with an absolute t-
statistic of over 5. However, only one other variable is significant at the 0.10 level, the DBEV 
dummy variable. None of our theoretic variables are significant in this case, but examining their 
signs we do find some rather weak support for the Transaction Cost Economics null hypotheses. 
The sign on RDE is negative, as is the sign on DCF. At the same time, the sign of the PAQ 
variable has now become positive. These signs are just as Transaction Cost Economics would 
predict in the food manufacturing sector. Yet, the generally mediocre performance of these 
variables in 2000 lends only very weak support to this theory. Overall, this year gives us very 
little insight into the relevant organizational model for this industry. 
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5.9.3   Fiscal 2001 
 The resulting parameter estimates on our organizational variables are similarly vague in 
fiscal 2001. Our model performs quite well during this year, with an F-statistic of 5.66. This 
yearly model explains the greatest proportion of variation in the dependant variable of any of our 
four regressions. Once more, the negative parameter estimate on the earnings yield variable 
dominates, with an absolute t-statistic now over 7. For this year,β  is also positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The DSFTDR dummy is the only such variable 
significant in 2001, producing a negative coefficient at the 0.10 level. Yet, despite the generally 
strong performance of the model, none of our organizational variables are statistically 
significant. The estimates on RDE and PAQ are positive, while the coefficient on the DCF 
variable takes a negative sign. This really gives us a mixed message about the pervading 
organizational structure. The RDE variable supports Agency Theory, while the DCF variable 
supports Transaction Cost Economics. The PAQ variable is rather inconclusive in the case when 
it is positive, being acceptable to either theory. Therefore, although our model performs quite 
well, the theoretical variables provide little understanding of the organizational design of this 
industry.       
5.9.4   Fiscal 2002 
 Up to this point, the organizational paradigm seems to have been nearly latent, and 
definitely problematic. However, in fiscal 2002 a dramatic change occurs. This model is 
somewhat congruent to the others, with an overall F-statistic of 5.17. Earnings yield is still 
negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, with an absolute t-statistic of over 2.3. Our 
DDAIRY and DWBL dummies are both significant at the 0.05 level, taking positive and 
negative signs respectively. Yet, none of these variables dominate our model. Rather, the most 
significant variables during this year are the organizational variables. All three have t-statistics of 
over 4, making them easily significant at the 0.01 level. Moreover, these variables are almost 
unanimous in their verdict about the organization of this sector. The PAQ variable takes a 
positive sign, which is acceptable under either theory, simply stating that the majority of those 
acquisitions that occurred were value-creating during this year. Yet, the signs on both RDE and 
DCF are also positive. This lends support to the presence of agency conflict in this industry. 
While the majority of acquisitions built firm value, capital structure was clearly used as a tool to 
bond management’s actions during 2002. Hence, this finding represents considerable evidence 
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for the authority of Agency Theory in explaining organization of the food manufacturing 
industry. 
5.10   Results Discussion 
 What overall judgments can we then make from these results? We have set out to 
examine which organizational economic theory pervades in the food processing industry. In 
reality, both theories likely contain credible ideas and concepts. Yet, as economic models we 
must strive to improve upon them, forsaking those with less ability to explain the complex and 
dynamic world in which we live. According to the scientific method, one must have valid 
contradictory evidence in order to reject a theory. This is precisely the case here, as we will only 
reject the null hypotheses of Transaction Cost Economic organization if we have statistically 
significant evidence indicating otherwise. 
 In two out of four years, we reject our capital structure null hypothesis. However, we fail 
to reject our firm expansion null hypothesis during all four years. Capital structure selection 
indicates agency problems, but we do not find value-destroying acquisition activity. Yet, this is 
not necessary under the tenets of Agency Theory. The findings about capital structure provide 
evidence for Agency Theory, while the results on firm expansion do not disagree with this 
model. Overall, it seems that Agency Theory has some ability to account for observed activity in 
this industry. At the same time, we find little support for our null hypotheses. In the entire 
sample, only one theoretic variable during fiscal 2002 is statistically significant in the direction 
predicted by Transaction Cost Economics. It is obvious that the predictive ability of Transaction 
Cost Economics in the food processing sector is weak at best, making the traditional reliance on 
this rationale a dangerous precept. When the theoretic variables are significant, they point to 
agency conflicts in this industry.  
 To scientifically investigate the validity of Transaction Cost Economics, single-tailed F-
tests of the null hypotheses for each theoretic variable were conducted simultaneously over all 
four years of the sample. The results of these tests are displayed below in table 5. The null 
hypothesis that DCF is less than zero is rejected at the 0.01 level, while we fail to reject that 
RDE is negative over this period. We also fail to reject the null hypothesis that PAQ is positive, 
although this finding provides little organizational insight. Given these results, we must reject the 
null hypothesis of Transaction Cost Economic organization in the food processing industry, due 
to evidence that capital structure is incorrectly described by this theory. The outcome concerning 
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acquisition does not contradict Agency Theory, and this model correctly explains these capital 
structure choices. Therefore, agency problems may exist in these firms, and as such analysts 
should consider Agency Theory when examining this industry. 
Table 5 
F-tests of Null Hypotheses for 1999-2002 
Null Hypothesis
F-statistic Critical Valueª
p -value Result
8.33* 6.63
0.42 6.63
6.87 -6.63
 O
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 Upon initial examination of our results, this type of conclusion might seem a bit bold. 
Even though we provide notable support for Agency Theory, there is still less consistency in 
these results than might be hoped. The last year of our analysis seems to be far more theoretically 
compelling than the earlier years. Yet, using historical knowledge of US equity markets, this 
would actually be the expected result. Markets are certainly dynamic, and it appears obvious that 
a structural change has occurred in the US during the past few years. Our theoretical variables 
are absolutely decisive in fiscal 2002, but why would this be?  
 This is likely because 2001 was approximately the period when this structural change 
occurred. 2001 witnessed the collapse of energy giant Enron, and the beginning of a string of 
corporate scandals. These scandals rocked the investing world, and almost certainly caused a 
fundamental change in investor sentiment within the US. In light of these scandals, Agency 
Theory has taken on an entirely new level of importance for the economy. The issues of 
governance and agency conflict are now foremost on the minds of investors. It is then no surprise 
that Agency Theory currently has significant explanatory power as an organizational model, 
much more so than before this structural change.  
 There have not yet been any large corporate scandals in the food processing industry, but 
the sector is potentially vulnerable to such events. When examining the ramifications of this 
structural change in the food processing industry, the nature of its investors must be considered. 
Food manufacturing companies typically have lowβ ’s (refer back to table 3), leading to industry 
    Note: ª at the 0.01 level,* denotes significance at the 0.01 level 
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returns that are less volatile than the broader market. Those investing in food processing firms 
are typically long-term investors, counting on measured growth and shelter from market 
downturns. These investors are now concerned with protecting their long positions, looking 
toward governance reforms to prevent firm implosions. Given this recent structural change and 
the characteristics of both firms and investors in this industry, it is not surprising that Agency 
Theory has gained explanatory power. Perhaps Agency Theory has not always been the 
dominant organizational model in the food processing industry, but it seems clear that it is today. 
There is one other very important consideration that must be remembered in weighing 
these theories. In this debate, it appears that Transaction Cost Economics is a sort of all or 
nothing argument. If we admit the presence of some agency conflict, then we must admit the 
existence of agency problems in general. Even if our results had not been as conclusive, just one 
year indicating discord between principles and agents would theoretically doom Transaction 
Cost Economics. Our empirical results are much stronger, but at the bare minimum they indicate 
that agency problems do persist to some degree in the food processing industry.  This, in and of 
itself, is a major result that suggests the tenets of Agency Theory should be considered when 
analyzing the strategic actions of firms in this sector. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Application 
6.1   Organizational Analysis 
 How then are these results relevant? This paper began with a discussion of why it is vital 
for agricultural producers to understand the food processing firm’s decision process, but we also 
noted how little is currently known. Yet, if the appropriate organizational model can be 
determined, then one can predict the activity of an individual firm as a function of that firm’s 
specific organizational characteristics. We call this type of approach “organizational analysis”. 
This tool may also be helpful in explaining firm actions ex-post. For example, since we have 
shown that Agency Theory has relevance in the food processing industry, we can then 
productively analyze firm activity using observed governance structures and the principles of this 
paradigm. Strongly governed firms will pursue the objectives of owners, while weakly governed 
firms will pursue the interests of management. The decisions of food manufacturers can then be 
explained or predicted in relation to these aspects by farmers or other interested parties. In any 
case where an organizational model can be proven relevant, a great deal can be inferred about the 
firm’s decision process. We are unaware of the concept of organizational analysis appearing 
previously, but it is only a logical extension of this type of research.  
6.1.1   Capital Structure Analysis 
Our study has dealt specifically with the aspects of capital structure and acquisition. 
Using our results about organization in this industry, we can then provide some simple diagrams 
of how organizational analysis might be conducted. In terms of capital structure, our results 
indicate that we can expect firms with stronger governance to increase value by bonding 
management with more debt, as diagramed in figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 6                     Organizational Analysis of the Capital Structure Decision 
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6.1.2   Acquisition Analysis 
As far as firm expansion is concerned, Agency Theory suggests that companies with stronger 
governance structures will undertake acquisitions that increase firm value, while those with weak 
governance will engage in value-destroying acquisition, as shown in figure 5. We have found 
acquisitions to be value-building in this industry, but if agency problems exist then such 
undesirable actions are still a distinct possibility. 
 
 
Though merely simplistic layouts for how these problems can be considered, such diagrams are 
constructive in showing the manner in which organizational analysis can be undertaken. Once we 
know the underlying organizational paradigm, we then have insight into numerous aspects of the 
firm.  
6.1.3 Organizational Analysis Example 
 To illustrate this concept, we will return a final time to our chicken industry example. As 
we have already discussed, chicken producers will often be part of a network of suppliers 
dominated by one local processor. A hypothetical scenario where organizational analysis might 
be invaluable thus includes an independent chicken grower’s decision to adopt a new breed of 
broilers. These chicks have slightly higher purchase costs, but improved carcass yields make 
these genetics profitable to the grower. However, gains from this broiler variety can only be 
realized if the processor invests in new cutting technologies capable of harvesting the additional 
yields. This decision then becomes completely dependant on the actions of the food processor. 
 Organizational analysis can be used to infer whether the chicken processor will undertake 
this investment. Suppose it is even clear that purchasing modern cutting equipment has 
transactional justification in this case, leading to increased profitability for the manufacturer. 
Figure 7                     Organizational Analysis of the Acquisition Decision 
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This investment decision might seem straightforward, but we have shown that Agency Theory 
must also be considered in the food processing industry. This particular chicken manufacturing 
firm is subject to weak internal and external governance, and is believed to suffer from serious 
agency conflicts. Given such a governance structure, the producer consequently may not be 
confidant that this company’s management is acting to maximize profits. The grower will then 
be unwilling to rely on the processor’s investment, and will adopt strategy accordingly by 
retaining conventional broiler genetics in their operation. By using organizational analysis, the 
grower is able to choose their optimal non-cooperative strategy and maximize returns in the 
market.  
 This truly shows the practical value of organizational research. Specifically, our diagrams 
and example demonstrate how the principles of Agency Theory can be used to undertake a 
methodical examination of individual firms in the food processing industry. This is useful to 
agricultural producers and other actors in the food channel, as it allows for inference about the 
future actions of these firms. These smaller players will no longer find themselves completely 
unapprised of new initiatives in the food system, but rather can make preemptive decisions to 
counter the expected strategies of powerful food manufacturing firms. 
 The modern corporation is certainly one of the most veiled and impenetrable economic 
actors. Yet, using organizational analysis and some endowment of relevant information about the 
firm’s governance structure and opportunity set, we should be able to successfully predict or 
explain many firm strategies. This then provides a basic theoretical framework for analyzing the 
actions of complex firms, something sorely missing from the field of agricultural economics at 
the current time. 
6.2   Implications for Future Empirical Studies 
 There is another specific application for these results. Nearly as important as our findings 
indicating the efficacy of Agency Theory, are simply those indicating the fundamental relevance 
of organizational economics. Firm organization has often been overlooked in economics and 
finance. Financial markets are full of various types of information that make stock price 
movements very difficult to explain. It is important to notice the usefulness of these 
organizational proxies in explaining some of this market randomness. This shows that these 
theories are capable of analyzing the rather opaque firm decision-making process. Our models 
lend support to the idea that organizational structure affects firm performance, regardless of 
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whether these factors are explicitly considered by investors. Consequently, the presented results 
provide some credence for including organizational variables in future financial studies. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion 
7.1 Summary 
 The objective of this paper was to determine which prevalent organizational model, 
Transaction Cost Economics or Agency Theory, best describes the actions of food processors. To 
explore this question, we have developed logical predictions from these theories through a 
detailed examination of the food processing industry. Our null hypotheses were that the 
traditional Transaction Cost Economic model would best describe capital structure and 
expansion activity in the food manufacturing industry. To meet our study objective, we have 
empirically tested these hypotheses in a sample of food processing firms. 
 Our empirical results lead us to reject the first null hypothesis of Transaction Cost 
Economics explaining capital structure in this sector. The positive effects of debt on firm value 
suggest its use to bond management. The negative impact of free cash flow supports the idea that 
weakly governed managers are pursuing undesired investments. These empirical results closely 
match the predictions of Agency Theory, and refute the widely accepted Transaction Cost 
Economics rationale. 
 However, our findings also support failing to reject the second null hypothesis, which 
states that Transaction Cost Economics describes firm expansion in this industry. Acquisition 
activity has a positive impact on firm value in our sample. This defends the idea that these 
expansions are undertaken to reduce the costs associated with exchange. Yet, this does not mean 
that we accept Transaction Cost Economics as the correct theory. The empirical evidence 
supports the predictions of this model, but does not necessarily contradict Agency Theory. 
 In terms of our study objective, it seems that we can draw some important conclusions 
about organization of the food manufacturing industry. Capital structure seems to be a tool for 
assuaging agency losses, but the majority of acquisitions are revealed to be value-building. 
Agency Theory allows for value-destroying expansion, but certainly does not preclude 
acquisitions that increase firm value. Thus, the rejection of the first null hypothesis supports 
Agency Theory, while the failure to reject the second does not disagree with it. Therefore, 
Agency Theory appears to be the better organizational model for explaining the actions of food 
processors.  
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 The results concur with recent developments in the US securities market. The evidence 
for Agency Theory is much stronger in 2002. Organizational structures certainly evolve over 
time, and it is logical that the highly publicized corporate scandals beginning in late 2001 had a 
substantial effect. The market, and more generally public opinion, blamed losses on agency 
problems. Sentiment was fundamentally altered, as investors started to ponder how great the 
misalignment of incentives between managers and shareholders might be. There appears little 
reason why these events would not have impacted the food manufacturing industry. Agency 
Theory may have only recently become meaningful to food processors, but it seems that 
resolving agency conflict is currently an important consideration in firm decision-making. This 
makes Agency Theory the appropriate organizational model for analyzing activity in the food 
processing industry. 
 This information can now be used by agricultural producers and other parties in the food 
system. Food processors often have a strong influence on smaller players, especially farmers. 
With increased knowledge of how these firms make decisions, agricultural producers can adopt 
improved strategies. Marketing channels for agricultural commodities will continue to be 
coordinated by food manufacturers, but farmers can now better understand these actions and 
position themselves accordingly. 
7.2   Research Opportunities   
This study is a starting point for further research in this field. What has been provided is 
merely an initial overview and simple test of these powerful organizational theories. Our 
experiments were exceedingly broad, lacking data with pure organizational meaning. Initial 
results indicate the appropriateness of Agency Theory for describing organization of the food 
processing industry. However, different tests in other sectors need to be undertaken in order to 
verify the general robustness of this finding. Numerous predictions of organizational theory 
could be applied, preferably using more specific data tied directly to firm organizational 
structure. There is a massive amount of work to be done in this area, with room for vastly 
improved tests of these theories. Unfortunately, firm specific data on organizational 
characteristics can be quite difficult to obtain. Though this information may be hard to come by, 
it appears that the rewards for such endeavors could be a substantial expansion of our basic 
understanding of economic organization. 
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Organizational principles are tied to nearly every economic discipline, and as such 
research in this area should be widely beneficial. Large corporations dominate the US economy. 
It appears this fact will become even truer in the food processing industry, where consolidation 
and industrialization continue to raise the level of concentration (Harris et al. 2002, 6). The 
interaction between agricultural producers and food manufacturers is becoming increasingly 
important to the evolution of the US food system. Coordination has increased substantially in 
recent years, forcing farmers to work more closely with food processing firms. This bargaining 
process has been difficult for agricultural producers, as it is hard enough to predict the actions of 
supposedly rational individuals, let alone companies filled with thousands of such actors.  
The problem can become nearly intractable, and as a result has been almost ignored, even 
in academia. Yet, beyond its importance to agriculture or even the US economy, our 
understanding of how complex firms operate and why they undertake certain activities is 
fundamental to the field of economics. If we as economists are to truly have an understanding of 
our science that goes beyond the proverbial “black box” of introductory production courses, then 
the theories of economic organization must be the foundation.    
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